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The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and
Optimal Monetary Policy 
The consequences for the proper conduct of monetary policy of the
existence of a lower bound of zero for overnight nominal interest rates has
recently become a topic of lively interest. In Japan the call rate (the
overnight cash rate analogous to the federal funds rate in the United
States) has been within 50 basis points of zero since October 1995, and it
has been essentially equal to zero for most of the past four years (ﬁg-
ure 1). Thus the Bank of Japan has had little room to further reduce short-
term nominal interest rates in all that time. Meanwhile Japan’s growth has
remained anemic, and prices have continued to fall, suggesting a need for
monetary stimulus. Yet the usual remedy—lower short-term nominal
interest rates—is plainly unavailable. Vigorous expansion of the mone-
tary base has also seemed to do little to stimulate demand under these cir-
cumstances: as ﬁgure 1 also shows, the monetary base is now more than
twice as large, relative to GDP, as it was in the early 1990s.
In the United States, meanwhile, the federal funds rate has now been
reduced to only 1 percent, and signs of recovery remain exceedingly frag-
ile. This has led many to wonder if this country might not also soon ﬁnd
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Figure 1. Japan: Call Rate on Overnight Loans and Ratio of Monetary Base to GDP,
1990–2002
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1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:11  Page 140tool for macroeconomic stabilization. A number of other countries face
similar questions. John Maynard Keynes first raised the question of what
can be done to stabilize the economy when it has fallen into a liquidity
trap—when interest rates have fallen to a level below which they cannot
be driven by further monetary expansion—and whether monetary policy
can be effective at all under such circumstances. Long treated as a mere
theoretical curiosity, Keynes’s question now appears to be one of urgent
practical importance, but one with which theorists have become
unfamiliar.
The question of how policy should be conducted when the zero bound
is reached—or when the possibility of reaching it can no longer be
ignored—raises many fundamental issues for the theory of monetary pol-
icy. Some would argue that awareness of the possibility of hitting the zero
bound calls for fundamental changes in the way policy is conducted even
before the bound has been reached. For example, Paul Krugman refers to
deﬂation as a “black hole,”1 from which an economy cannot expect to
escape once it has entered. A conclusion often drawn from this pes-
simistic view of the efﬁcacy of monetary policy in a liquidity trap is that
it is vital to steer far clear of circumstances in which deﬂationary expecta-
tions could ever begin to develop—for example, by targeting a sufﬁ-
ciently high positive rate of inﬂation even under normal circumstances.
Others are more sanguine about the continuing effectiveness of monetary
policy even when the zero bound is reached. For example, it is often
argued that deﬂation need not be a black hole, because monetary policy
can affect aggregate spending, and hence inﬂation, through channels other
than central bank control of short-term nominal interest rates. Thus there
has been much recent discussion, with respect to both Japan and the
United States—of the advantages of vigorous expansion of the monetary
base even without any further reduction in interest rates, of the desirabil-
ity of attempts to shift longer-term interest rates through central bank pur-
chases of longer-maturity government securities, and even of the
desirability of central bank purchases of other kinds of assets. 
Yet if these views are correct, they challenge much of the recent con-
ventional wisdom regarding the conduct of monetary policy, both within
central banks and among academic monetary economists. That wisdom
has stressed a conception of the problem of monetary policy in terms of
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1. Paul Krugman, “Crisis in Prices?” New York Times, December 31, 2002, p. A19.
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rates, and the prescriptions formulated for monetary policy, such as the
celebrated Taylor rule,2 are typically cast in these terms. Indeed, some
have argued that the inability of such a policy to prevent the economy
from falling into a deﬂationary spiral is a critical ﬂaw of the Taylor rule as
a guide to policy.3
Similarly, concern over the possibility of entering a liquidity trap is
sometimes presented as a serious objection to another currently popular
monetary policy prescription, namely, inﬂation targeting. The deﬁnition
of a policy prescription in terms of an inﬂation target presumes that there
is in fact some level of the nominal interest rate that can allow the target
to be hit (or at least projected to be hit, on average). But, some argue, if
the zero interest rate bound is reached under circumstances of deﬂation, it
will not be possible to hit any higher inﬂation target, because further
interest rate decreases are not possible. Is there, in such circumstances,
any point in having an inﬂation target? The Bank of Japan has frequently
offered this argument as a reason for resisting inﬂation targeting. For
example, Kunio Okina, director of the Institute for Monetary and Eco-
nomic Studies at the Bank of Japan, was quoted as arguing that “because
short-term interest rates are already at zero, setting an inﬂation target of,
say, 2 percent wouldn’t carry much credibility.”4
We seek to shed light on these issues by considering the consequences
of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates for the optimal conduct
of monetary policy, in the context of an explicitly intertemporal equilib-
rium model of the monetary transmission mechanism. Although our
model is extremely simple, we believe it can help clarify some of the basic
issues just raised. We are able to consider the extent to which the zero
bound represents a genuine constraint on attainable equilibrium paths for
inﬂation and real activity, and the extent to which open-market purchases
of various kinds of assets by the central bank can mitigate that constraint.
We are also able to show how the existence of the zero bound changes the
character of optimal monetary policy, relative to the policy rules that
would be judged optimal in its absence or in the case of real disturbances
small enough for the bound never to matter under an optimal policy.
142 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
2. Taylor (1993).
3. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001).
4. “Japan BOJ Ofﬁcial: Hard to Set Inﬂation Targets,” Dow Jones News, August 11,
1999.
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important constraint on what monetary stabilization policy can achieve, at
least when certain kinds of real disturbances are encountered in an envi-
ronment of low inﬂation. We argue that the possibility of expanding the
monetary base through central bank purchases of a variety of types of
assets does little if anything to expand the set of feasible paths for inﬂa-
tion and real activity that are consistent with equilibrium under some
(fully credible) policy commitment.
Hence the relevant trade-offs can correctly be studied by simply con-
sidering what alternative anticipated state-contingent paths of the short-
term nominal interest rate can achieve, taking into account the constraint
that this rate must be nonnegative at all times. Doing so, we ﬁnd that the
zero interest rate bound can indeed be temporarily binding, and when it is,
it inevitably results in lower welfare than could be achieved in the
absence of such a constraint.5
Nonetheless, we argue that the zero bound restricts possible stabiliza-
tion outcomes under sound policy to a much more modest degree than
the deflation pessimists presume. Even though the set of feasible equilib-
rium outcomes corresponds to those that can be achieved through alter-
native interest rate policies, monetary policy is far from powerless to
mitigate the contractionary effects of the kind of disturbances that would
make the zero bound a binding constraint. The key to dealing with this
sort of situation in the least damaging way is to create the right kind of
expectations regarding how monetary policy will be used after the con-
straint is no longer binding, and the central bank again has room to
maneuver. We use our intertemporal equilibrium model to characterize
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5. We do not explore here the possibility of relaxing the constraint by taxing money
balances, as originally proposed by Gesell (1929) and Keynes (1936), and more recently by
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2001) and Goodfriend (2000). Although this represents a solu-
tion to the problem in theory, it presents substantial practical difﬁculties, not the least of
which is the political opposition that such an institutional change would be likely to gener-
ate. Our consideration of the problem of optimal policy also abstracts from the availability
of  ﬁscal instruments, such as the time-varying tax policy recommended by Feldstein
(2002). We agree with Feldstein that there is a particularly good case for state-contingent
ﬁscal policy to deal with a liquidity trap, even if ﬁscal policy is not a very useful tool for
stabilization policy more generally. Nonetheless, we consider here only the problem of the
proper conduct of monetary policy, taking as given the structure of tax distortions. As long
as one does not think that state-contingent ﬁscal policy can (or will) be used to eliminate
even temporary declines in the natural rate of interest below zero, the problem for monetary
policy that we consider here remains relevant.
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able to create, and we discuss a form of price-level targeting rule that—
if credibly committed to—should bring about the constrained-optimal
equilibrium. We also discuss, more informally, how other types of policy
actions could help increase the credibility of the central bank’s
announced commitment to this kind of future policy.
Our analysis will be recognized as a development of several key
themes in Paul Krugman’s treatment of the same topic in these pages a
few years ago.6 Like Krugman, we give particular emphasis to the role of
expectations regarding future policy in determining the severity of the
distortions that result from hitting the zero bound. Our primary contribu-
tion, relative to Krugman’s earlier treatment, will be the presentation of a
more fully dynamic analysis. For example, our assumption of staggered
pricing, rather than Krugman’s simple hypothesis of prices that are ﬁxed
for one period, allows for richer (and at least somewhat more realistic)
dynamic responses to disturbances. In our model, unlike in Krugman’s, a
real disturbance that lowers the natural rate of interest can cause output to
remain below potential for years (as shown in ﬁgure 2 later in the paper),
rather than only for a single “period,” even when the average frequency of
price adjustments is more than once a year. These richer dynamics are
also important for a realistic discussion of the kind of policy commitment
that can help to reduce economic contraction during a liquidity trap. In
our model a commitment to create subsequent inflation involves a com-
mitment to keep interest rates low for some time in the future, whereas in
Krugman’s model a commitment to a higher future price level does not
involve any reduction in future nominal interest rates. We are also better
able to discuss such questions as how the creation of inflationary expec-
tations while the zero bound is binding can be reconciled with maintain-
ing the credibility of the central bank’s commitment to long-run price
stability.
Our dynamic analysis also allows us to further clarify the several ways
in which the central bank’s management of private sector expectations
can be expected to mitigate the effects of the zero bound. Krugman
emphasizes the fact that increased expectations of inﬂation can lower the
real interest rate implied by a zero nominal interest rate. This might sug-
gest, however, that the central bank can affect the economy only insofar
144 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
6. Krugman (1998).
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except quite indirectly; it might also suggest that the only expectations
that should matter are those regarding inﬂation over the relatively short
horizon corresponding to the term of the nominal interest rate that has
fallen to zero. Such interpretations easily lead to skepticism about the
practical effectiveness of the expectations channel, especially if inﬂation
is regarded as being relatively “sticky” in the short run. Our model is
instead one in which expectations affect aggregate demand through sev-
eral channels. 
First of all, it is not merely short-term real interest rates that matter for
current aggregate demand; our model of intertemporal substitution in
spending implies that the entire expected future path of short-term real
rates should matter, or alternatively that very long term real rates should
matter.7 This means that the creation of inﬂation expectations, even with
regard to inﬂation that should not occur until at least a year into the future,
should also be highly relevant to aggregate demand, as long as it is not
accompanied by correspondingly higher expected future nominal interest
rates. Furthermore, the expected future path of nominal interest rates
matters, and not just their current level, so that a commitment to keep
nominal interest rates low for a longer period of time should stimulate
aggregate demand, even when current interest rates cannot be lowered
further, and even under the hypothesis that inflation expectations would
remain unaffected. Because the central bank can clearly control the
future path of short-term nominal interest rates if it has the will to do so,
any failure of such a commitment to be credible will not be due to skep-
ticism about whether the central bank is able to follow through on its
commitment.
The richer dynamics of our model are also important for the analysis of
optimal policy. Krugman mainly addresses the question of whether mon-
etary policy is completely impotent when the zero bound binds, and he
argues for the possibility of increasing real activity in the liquidity trap by
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7. In the simple model presented here, this occurs solely as a result of intertemporal
substitution in private expenditure. But there are a number of reasons to expect long-term
rates, rather than short-term rates, to be the critical determinant of aggregate demand. For
example, in an open-economy model, the real exchange rate becomes an important deter-
minant of aggregate demand. But the real exchange rate should be closely linked to a very
long domestic real rate of return (or alternatively to the expected future path of short-term
rates) as a result of interest rate parity, together with an anchor for the expected long-term
real exchange rate (deriving, for example, from long-run purchasing power parity).
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sion, it does not answer the question of whether, or to what extent, it
would be desirable to create such expectations, given the well-founded
reasons that the central bank should have to not prefer inﬂation at a later
time. Nor is Krugman’s model well suited to address such a question,
insofar as it omits any reason for even an extremely high subsequent inﬂa-
tion to be deemed harmful. Our staggered-pricing model instead implies
that inﬂation (whether anticipated or not) does create distortions, justify-
ing an objective function for stabilization policy that trades off inﬂation
stabilization and output gap stabilization in terms that are often assumed
to represent actual central bank concerns. We characterize optimal policy
in such a setting and show that it does indeed involve a commitment to
history-dependent policy of a sort that should result in higher inﬂation
expectations in response to a binding zero bound. We can also show to
what extent it should be optimal to create such expectations, assuming
that this is possible. We ﬁnd, for example, that it is not optimal to commit
to so much future inﬂation that the zero bound ceases to bind, even though
this is one possible type of equilibrium; this is why the zero bound does
remain a relevant constraint, even under an optimal policy commitment.
Is Quantitative Easing a Separate Policy Instrument?
A ﬁrst question we wish to consider is whether expansion of the mone-
tary base represents a policy instrument that should be effective in
preventing deﬂation and an associated output decline, even under circum-
stances where overnight interest rates have fallen to zero. According to
Keynes’s famous analysis,8 monetary policy ceases to be an effective
instrument to head off economic contraction in a “liquidity trap,” which
can arise if interest rates fall so low that further expansion of the money
supply cannot drive them lower. Others have argued that monetary expan-
sion should increase nominal aggregate demand even under such circum-
stances, and the supposition that this is correct lies behind Japan’s explicit
adoption, since March 2001, of a policy of “quantitative easing” in addi-
tion to the zero interest rate policy that continues to be maintained.9
146 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
8. Keynes (1936).
9. See Kimura and others (2002) for a discussion of this policy as well as an expression
of doubts about its effectiveness.
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poral equilibrium model, which models both the demand for money and
the role of ﬁnancial assets (including the monetary base) in private sector
budget constraints. The model we use for this purpose is more detailed in
several senses than that used in subsequent sections to characterize opti-
mal policy. We do this to make it clear that we have not excluded a role
for quantitative easing simply by failing to model the role of money in the
economy.10
Our key result is an irrelevance proposition for open-market operations
in a variety of types of assets that the central bank might acquire, under
the assumption that the open-market operations do not change the
expected future conduct of monetary or ﬁscal policy (in senses that we
specify below). It is perhaps worth noting at the outset that our intention
in stating such a result is not to vindicate the view that a central bank is
powerless to halt a deﬂationary slump, and hence to absolve the Bank of
Japan, for example, of any responsibility for the continuing stagnation in
that country. Although our proposition establishes that there is a sense in
which a liquidity trap is possible, this does not mean that the central bank
is powerless under the circumstances we describe. Rather, our intent is to
show that the key to effective central bank action to combat a deﬂationary
slump is the management of expectations. Open-market operations should
be largely ineffective to the extent that they fail to change expectations
regarding future policy; the conclusion we draw is not that such actions
are futile, but rather that the central bank’s actions should be chosen with
a view to signaling the nature of its policy commitments, and not for the
purpose of creating some sort of “direct” effects.
A Neutrality Proposition for Open-Market Operations
Our model abstracts from endogenous variations in the capital stock
and assumes perfectly ﬂexible wages (or some other mechanism for efﬁ-
cient labor contracting), but it assumes monopolistic competition in goods
markets and sticky prices that are adjusted at random intervals in the man-
ner assumed by Guillermo Calvo, so that deﬂation has real effects.11 We
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10. Woodford (forthcoming, chapter 4) discusses the model in more detail and consid-
ers the consequences of various interest rate rules and money growth rules under the
assumption that disturbances are not large enough for the zero bound to bind.
11. Calvo (1983).
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tion of the form
where Ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption of each of a contin-
uum of differentiated goods,
with an elasticity of substitution θ>1; Mt measures end-of-period house-
hold money balances,12 Pt is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index,
and Ht(j) is the quantity supplied of labor of type j. Real balances are
included in the utility function,13 as a proxy for the services that money
balances provide in facilitating transactions.14 Each industry j employs an
industry-speciﬁc type of labor, with its own wage.
For each value of the disturbances  t, u(⋅, ⋅;  t) is a concave function,
increasing in the ﬁrst argument and increasing in the second for all levels
of real balances up to a satiation level m –(Ct;  t). The existence of a satia-
tion level is necessary in order for it to be possible for the zero interest
rate bound ever to be reached; we regard Japan’s experience over the past
several years as having settled the theoretical debate over whether such a
level of real balances exists. Unlike many papers in the literature, we do
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12. We do not introduce fractional-reserve banking into our model. Technically, Mt
refers to the monetary base, and we represent households as obtaining liquidity services
from holding this base, either directly or through intermediaries (not modeled).
13. Following Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1974, 1975).
14. We use this approach to modeling the transactions demand for money because of
its familiarity. As shown in Woodford (forthcoming, appendix section A.16), a cash-in-
advance model leads to equilibrium conditions of essentially the same general form, and
the neutrality result that we present below would hold in essentially identical form were we
to model the transactions demand for money after the fashion of Lucas and Stokey (1987).
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which money can affect aggregate demand, namely, by an effect of real
money balances on the current marginal utility of consumption. Similarly,
for each value of  t, υ(⋅;  t) is an increasing convex function. The vector
of exogenous disturbances  t may contain several elements, so that no
assumption is made about correlation of the exogenous shifts in the func-
tions u and υ.
For simplicity we assume complete ﬁnancial markets and no limit on
borrowing against future income. As a consequence, a household faces an
intertemporal budget constraint of the form
looking forward from any period t. Here Qt,T is the stochastic discount fac-
tor that the ﬁnancial markets use to value random nominal income at date
T in monetary units at date t; δt is the opportunity cost of holding money
and is equal to it/(1 + it), where it is the riskless nominal interest rate on
one-period obligations purchased in period t, in the case that no interest is
paid on the monetary base; Wt is the nominal value of the household’s
ﬁnancial wealth (including money holdings) at the beginning of period t;
Πt(i) represents the nominal proﬁts (revenue in excess of the wage bill) in
period t of the supplier of good i; wt(j) is the nominal wage earned by
labor of type j in period t, and Tt
h represents the net nominal tax liabilities
of each household in period t. Optimizing household behavior then
implies the following necessary conditions for a rational expectations
equilibrium. Optimal timing of household expenditure requires that
aggregate demand Yt for the composite good satisfy an Euler equation of
the form15
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15. For simplicity, we abstract from government purchases of goods. Our equilibrium
conditions directly extend to the case of exogenous government purchases, as shown in
Woodford (forthcoming, chapter 4).
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leads to a static ﬁrst-order condition of the form
under the assumption that zero interest is paid on the monetary base, and
that preferences are such as to exclude the possibility of a corner solution
with zero money balances. If both consumption and liquidity services are
normal goods, this equilibrium condition can be solved uniquely for the
level of real balances L(Yt, it;  t) that satisfy it in the case of any positive
nominal interest rate. The equilibrium relation can then equivalently be
written as a pair of inequalities:
together with the “complementary slackness” condition that at least one
must hold with equality at any time. Here we deﬁne L(Y, 0;  ) = m –(Y;  ),
the minimum level of real balances for which um = 0, so that the function
L is continuous at i = 0. Household optimization similarly requires that
the paths of aggregate real expenditure and the price index satisfy the
bounds
looking forward from any period t, where Dt measures the total nominal
value of government liabilities (monetary base plus government debt) at
the end of period t under the monetary-fiscal policy regime. (The condi-
tion in expression 5 is required for the existence of a well-defined inter-
temporal budget constraint, under the assumption that there are no
limitations on households’ ability to borrow against future income,
whereas the transversality condition in equation 6 must hold if the house-
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1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:11  Page 150hold hits its intertemporal budget constraint.) The conditions in expres-
sions 2 through 6 also suffice to imply that the representative household
chooses optimal consumption and portfolio plans (including its planned
holdings of money balances) given its income expectations and the
prices (including financial asset prices) that it faces, while making
choices that are consistent with financial market clearing. 
Each differentiated good i is supplied by a single, monopolistically
competitive producer. There are assumed to be many goods in each of an
inﬁnite number of industries; each industry j uses a type of labor that is
speciﬁc to that industry, and all goods in an industry change their prices at
the same time. Each good is produced in accordance with a common pro-
duction function
where At is an exogenous productivity factor common to all industries;
f(⋅) is an increasing, concave function; and ht(i) is the industry-speciﬁc
labor hired by ﬁrm i. The representative household supplies all types of
labor and consumes all types of goods.16
The supplier of good i sets a price for that good at which it satisﬁes
demand in each period, hiring the labor inputs necessary to meet that
demand. Given households’ allocation of demand across goods in
response to ﬁrms’ pricing decisions, on the one hand, and the terms on
which optimizing households are willing to supply each type of labor, on
the other, we can show that nominal proﬁts (sales revenue in excess of
labor costs) in period t of the supplier of good i are given by the function
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16. We might alternatively assume specialization across households in the type of labor
supplied; in the presence of perfect sharing of labor income risk across households, house-
hold decisions regarding consumption and labor supply would all be as assumed here.
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:11  Page 151where pt
j is the common price charged by the other ﬁrms in industry j.17
(We introduce the notation   ˜
t for the complete vector of exogenous dis-
turbances, including variations in technology as well as in preferences.) If
prices were fully ﬂexible, pt(i) would be chosen each period to maximize
this function.
Instead we suppose that prices remain ﬁxed in monetary terms for a
random period of time. Following Calvo, we suppose that each industry
has an equal probability of reconsidering its prices each period, and we let
0 <α<1 be the fraction of industries whose prices remain unchanged
each period. In any industry that revises its prices in period t, the new
price pt* will be the same. This price is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order
condition
We note furthermore that the stochastic discount factor used to price
future proﬁt streams will be given by
Finally, the deﬁnition in equation 1 implies a law of motion for the aggre-
gate price index of the form
Equations 7 and 9, which jointly determine the path of prices given
demand conditions, represent the aggregate supply block of our model. It
remains to specify the monetary and ﬁscal policies of the government.18
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17. In equilibrium, all ﬁrms in an industry charge the same price at any given time. But
we must deﬁne proﬁts for an individual supplier i in the case of contemplated deviations
from the equilibrium price.
18. The particular speciﬁcation of monetary and ﬁscal policy proposed here is not
intended to suggest that either monetary or ﬁscal policy must be expected to be conducted
according to rules of the sort assumed here. Indeed, in later sections we recommend policy
commitments on the part of both the monetary and the ﬁscal authorities that do not conform
to the assumptions made here. The point is to deﬁne what we mean by the qualiﬁcation that
open-market operations are irrelevant if they do not change expected future monetary or
ﬁscal policy. To make sense of such a statement, we must deﬁne what it would mean for
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:11  Page 152To address the question of whether quantitative easing represents an addi-
tional tool of policy, we suppose that the central bank’s operating target
for the short-term nominal interest rate is determined by a feedback rule
in the spirit of the Taylor rule,19
where now   ˜
t may also include exogenous disturbances in addition to the
ones listed above, to which the central bank happens to respond. We
assume that the function φ is nonnegative for all values of its arguments
(otherwise the policy would not be feasible, given the zero lower bound),
but that there are conditions under which the rule prescribes a zero inter-
est rate policy. Such a rule implies that the central bank supplies the quan-
tity of base money that happens to be demanded at the interest rate given
by this formula; hence equation 10 implies a path for the monetary base,
so long as the value of φ is positive. However, under those conditions in
which the value of φ is zero, the policy commitment in equation 10
implies only a lower bound on the monetary base that must be supplied. In
these circumstances we may ask whether it matters whether a greater or a
smaller quantity of base money is supplied. We assume that the central
bank’s policy in this regard is speciﬁed by a base-supply rule of the form
where the multiplicative factor ψ satisﬁes the following two conditions:
for all values of its arguments. (The second condition implies that ψ=1
whenever it > 0.) Note that a base-supply rule of this form is consistent
with both the interest rate operating target speciﬁed in equation 10 and the
equilibrium relations in expressions 3 and 4. The use of quantitative
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these policies to be speciﬁed in a way that prevents them from being affected by past open-
market operations. The speciﬁc classes of policy rules discussed here show not only that
our concept of “unchanged policy” is logically possible, but indeed that it could correspond
to a policy commitment of a fairly familiar sort, one that would represent a commitment to
“sound policy” in the views of some.
19. Taylor (1993).
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 153easing as a policy tool can then be represented by a choice of a function ψ
that is greater than 1 under some circumstances. 
It remains to specify which sort of assets should be acquired (or dis-
posed of) by the central bank when it varies the size of the monetary base.
We allow the asset side of the central bank balance sheet to include any of
k  different types of securities, distinguished from each other by their
state-contingent returns. At the end of period t, the vector of nominal val-
ues of central bank holdings of the various securities is given by Mt t
m,
where  t
m is a vector of central bank portfolio shares. These shares are in
turn determined by a policy rule of the form
where the vector-valued function  m(⋅) has the property that its compo-
nents sum to 1 for all possible values of its arguments. The fact that  m(⋅)
depends on the same arguments as φ(⋅) means that we allow for the possi-
bility that the central bank changes its policy when the zero bound is bind-
ing (for example, buying assets that it would not hold at any other time).
The fact that it depends on the same arguments as ψ(⋅) allows us to spec-
ify changes in the composition of the central bank portfolio as a function
of the particular kinds of purchases associated with quantitative easing.
The payoffs on these securities in each state of the world are speciﬁed
by exogenously given (state-contingent) vectors at and bt and matrix Ft. A
vector of asset holdings zt–1 at the end of period t – 1 results in delivery, to
the owner of a quantity a′ tzt–1 of money, a quantity b′ tzt–1 of the consump-
tion good and a vector Ftzt–1 of securities that may be traded in the
period-t asset markets, each of which may depend on the state of the
world in period t. This ﬂexible speciﬁcation allows us to treat a wide
range of types of assets that may differ as to maturity, degree of indexa-
tion, and so on.20
The gross nominal return Rt(j) on the jth asset between periods t – 1
and t is then given by
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20. For example, security j in period t – 1 is a one-period riskless nominal bond if bt(j)
and Ft(⋅; j) are zero in all states, while at(j) > 0 is the same in all states. Security j is instead
a one-period real (or indexed) bond if at(j) and Ft(⋅; j) are zero, while bt(j) > 0 is the same
in all states. It is a two-period riskless nominal pure discount bond if instead at(j) and bt(j)
are zero, Ft(i, j) = 0 for all i ≠ k; Ft(k, j) > 0 is the same in all states, and security k in period
t is a one-period riskless nominal bond.
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 154where qt is the vector of nominal asset prices in (ex-dividend) period-t
trading. The absence of arbitrage opportunities implies as usual that equi-
librium asset prices must satisfy
where the stochastic discount factor is again given by equation 8. Under
the assumption that no interest is paid on the monetary base, the nominal
transfer by the central bank to the public treasury each period is equal to
where Rt is the vector of returns deﬁned by equation 13.
We specify ﬁscal policy in terms of a rule that determines the evolution
of total government liabilities Dt, here deﬁned to be inclusive of the mon-
etary base, as well as a rule that speciﬁes the composition of outstanding
nonmonetary liabilities (debt) among different types of securities that the
government might issue. We assume that the path of total government lia-
bilities accords with a rule of the form
which speciﬁes the acceptable level of real government liabilities as a
function of the preexisting level and various aspects of current macro-
economic conditions. This notation allows for such possibilities as an
exogenously speciﬁed state-contingent target for real government liabili-
ties as a proportion of GDP, or for the government budget deﬁcit (inclu-
sive of interest on the public debt) as a proportion of GDP, among others.
The part of total liabilities that consists of base money is speciﬁed by the
base rule in equation 11. We suppose, however, that the rest may be allo-
cated among any of a set of different types of securities that the govern-
ment may issue; for convenience, we assume that this is a subset of the set
of k securities that the central bank may purchase. If  f
jt indicates the
share of government debt (nonmonetary liabilities) at the end of period t
























   











′ = ′ + ′ []













aj P bj j
qj
t
tt t t t
t
=
++ ′ ⋅ qF
Gauti B. Eggertsson and Michael Woodford 155
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 155that is of type j, then the ﬂow government budget constraint takes the
form 
where Bt ≡ Dt – Mt is the total nominal value of end-of-period nonmone-
tary liabilities, and Th
t is the nominal value of the primary budget surplus
(taxes net of transfers, if we abstract from government purchases). This
identity can then be inverted to obtain the net tax collections Th
t implied
by a given rule (equation 16) for aggregate public liabilities; this depends
in general on the composition of the public debt as well as on total
borrowing.
Finally, we assume that debt management policy (the determination of
the composition of the government’s nonmonetary liabilities at each point
in time) is speciﬁed by the function
which speciﬁes the shares as a function of aggregate conditions, where
the vector-valued function  f also has components that sum to 1 for all
possible values of its arguments. Together the two relations in equations
16 and 17 complete our speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy and close our
model.21
We may now deﬁne a rational expectations equilibrium as a collection
of stochastic processes {pt*, Pt, Yt, it, qt, Mt,  t
m, Dt,  f
t}, with each
endogenous variable speciﬁed as a function of the history of exogenous
disturbances to that date, that satisfy each of the conditions in expressions
2 through 6 of the aggregate demand block of the model, the conditions in
equations 7 and 9 of the aggregate supply block, the asset-pricing rela-
tions equation 14, the conditions in equations 10 through 12 specifying
monetary policy, and the conditions in equations 16 and 17, specifying
ﬁscal policy in each period. We then obtain the following irrelevance
result for the speciﬁcation of certain aspects of policy:
() (/ ,; ˜ ), – 17 1      t
f f
tt t t PP Y =





h = ′ R   –– –– , 11
156 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
21. We might, of course, allow for other types of ﬁscal decisions from which we
abstract here—government purchases, tax incentives, and so on—some of which may be
quite relevant to dealing with a liquidity trap. But our concern here is solely with the ques-
tion of what monetary policy can achieve; we introduce a minimal speciﬁcation of ﬁscal
policy only for the sake of closing our general-equilibrium model, and to allow discussion
of the ﬁscal implications of possible actions by the central bank.
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 156PROPOSITION. The set of paths for the variables {pt*, Pt, Yt, it, qt, Dt}
that are consistent with the existence of a rational expectations equilib-
rium is independent of the speciﬁcation of the functions ψ (equation 11),
 m (equation 12), and  f (equation 17).
The reason for this is fairly simple. The set of restrictions on the
processes {pt*, Pt, Yt, it, qt, Dt} implied by our model can be written in a
form that does not involve the variables {Mt,  m
t ,  f
t}, and hence that
does not involve the functions ψ,  m, or  f. To show this, we ﬁrst note
that, for all m ≥ m –(C;  ),
because additional money balances beyond the satiation level provide no
further liquidity services. By differentiating this relation, we see further
that uc(C, m;  ) does not depend on the exact value of m either, as long as
m exceeds the satiation level. It follows that, in our equilibrium relations,
we can replace the expression uc(Yt, Mt/Pt;  t) with
using the fact that expression 3 holds with equality at all levels of real bal-
ances at which uc depends on the level of real balances. Hence we can
write uc as a function of variables other than Mt/Pt, without using the rela-
tion in equation 11, and so in a way that is independent of the function ψ.
We can similarly replace the expression um(Yt, Mt/Pt;   t)(Mt/Pt) in
expression 5 with
since Mt/Pt must equal L[Yt, φ(Pt/Pt–1, Yt;  t);  t] when real balances do
not exceed the satiation level, whereas um = 0 when they do. Finally, we
can express nominal proﬁts in period t as a function:
after substituting λ(Yt, Pt/Pt–1;  t) for the marginal utility of real income
in the wage demand function that is used in deriving the proﬁt function
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1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 157Π.22 Using these substitutions, we can write each of the equilibrium rela-
tions in expressions 2, 5, 6, 7, and 14 in a way that no longer makes refer-
ence to the money supply.
It then follows that in a rational expectations equilibrium the variables
{pt *, Pt, Yt, it, qt, Dt} must satisfy in each period the following relations:
along with equations 9, 10, and 16 as before. None of these involve the
variables {Mt, ωm
t , ωf
t}, nor do they involve the functions ψ,  m, or  f. 
Furthermore, this is the complete set of restrictions on these variables
that are required in order for them to be consistent with a rational expec-
tations equilibrium. For any given processes {pt *, Pt, Yt, it, qt, Dt} that
satisfy the equations just listed in each period, the implied path of the
money supply is given by equation 11, which clearly has a solution, and
this path for the money supply necessarily satisﬁes expression 3 and the
complementary slackness condition, as a result of our assumptions about
the form of the function ψ. Similarly, the implied compositions of the
central bank portfolio and of the public debt at each point in time are
given by equations 12 and 17. We then have a set of processes that satisfy
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22. See Woodford (forthcoming, chapter 3).
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 158all of the requirements for a rational expectations equilibrium, and the
result is established.
Discussion
The above proposition implies that neither the extent to which quanti-
tative easing is employed when the zero bound binds, nor the nature of the
assets that the central bank may purchase through open-market opera-
tions, has any effect on whether a deﬂationary price-level path represents
a rational expectations equilibrium. Hence our general-equilibrium analy-
sis of inﬂation and output determination does not support the notion that
expansions of the monetary base represent an additional tool of policy,
independent of the speciﬁcation of the rule for adjusting short-term nomi-
nal interest rates. If the commitments of policymakers regarding the rule
by which interest rates will be set, on the one hand, and the rule by which
total private sector claims on the government will be allowed to grow, on
the other, are fully credible, then it is only the choice of those commit-
ments that matters. Other aspects of policy should matter in practice only
insofar as they help to signal the nature of these policy commitments.
Of course, the validity of our result depends on the reasonableness of
our assumptions, and these deserve further discussion. Like any economic
model, ours abstracts from the complexity of actual economies in many
respects. Have we abstracted from features of actual economies that are
crucial for a correct understanding of the issues under discussion?
It might be suspected that an important omission is our neglect of port-
folio-balance effects, which play an important role in much recent discus-
sion of the policy options that would remain available to the Federal
Reserve should the federal funds rate reach zero.23 The idea is that a cen-
tral bank should be able to lower longer-term interest rates even when
overnight rates are already at zero, through purchases of longer-maturity
government bonds. This would shift the composition of the public debt in
the hands of the public in a way that affects the term structure of interest
rates. (Because it is generally admitted in such discussions that base
money and very short term Treasury securities have become near-perfect
substitutes once short-term interest rates have fallen to zero, the desired
effect should be achieved equally well by a shift in the maturity structure
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23. See, for example, Clouse and others (2003) and Orphanides (2003).
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monetary base, as by an open-market purchase of long-term bonds with
newly created base money.)
No such effects arise in our model, whether from central bank securi-
ties purchases or debt management by the public treasury. But this is not,
as some might expect, because we have simply assumed that bonds of dif-
ferent maturities (or for that matter, other kinds of assets that the central
bank might choose to purchase instead of the shortest-maturity Treasury
bills) are perfect substitutes. Our framework allows for central bank pur-
chases of different assets having different risk characteristics (different
state-contingent returns), and our model of asset market equilibrium
incorporates those term premiums and risk premiums that are consistent
with the absence of arbitrage opportunities. 
Our conclusion differs from that of the literature on portfolio balance
effects for a different reason. The classic theoretical analysis of portfolio
balance effects assumes a representative investor with mean-variance
preferences. This has the implication that if the supply of assets that pay
off disproportionately in certain states of the world is increased (so that
the extent to which the representative investor’s portfolio pays off in
those states must also increase), the relative marginal valuation of income
in those particular states is reduced, resulting in a lower relative price for
the assets that pay off in those states. But in our general-equilibrium asset
pricing model, there is no such effect. The marginal utility to the repre-
sentative household of additional income in a given state of the world
depends on the household’s consumption in that state, not on the aggre-
gate payoff of its asset portfolio in that state. And changes in the compo-
sition of the securities in the hands of the public do not change the
state-contingent consumption of the representative household—this
depends on equilibrium output, and although output is endogenous, we
have shown that the equilibrium relations that determine it do not involve
the functions ψ,  m, or   f.24
Our assumption of complete ﬁnancial markets and no limits on bor-
rowing against future income may also appear extreme. However, the
160 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
24. Our general-equilibrium analysis is in the spirit of the irrelevance proposition for
open-market operations of Wallace (1981). Wallace’s analysis is often supposed to be of
little practical relevance for actual monetary policy because his model is one in which
money serves only as a store of value, so that an equilibrium in which short-term Treasury
securities dominate money in terms of rate of return is not possible, although this is
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us to write the budget constraint of the representative household in a sim-
ple way. Even in the case of incomplete markets, each of the assets that is
traded will be priced according to equation 14, where the stochastic dis-
count factor is given by equation 8, and once again there will be a set of
relations to determine output, goods prices, and asset prices that do not
involve ψ,  m, or   f. The absence of borrowing limits is also innocuous,
at least in the case of a representative-household model, because in equi-
librium the representative household must hold the entire net supply of
ﬁnancial claims on the government. As long as the ﬁscal rule (equa-
tion 16) implies positive government liabilities at each date, any borrow-
ing limits that might be assumed can never bind in equilibrium.
Borrowing limits can matter more in the case of a model with heteroge-
neous households. But in this case the effects of open-market operations
should depend not merely on which sorts of assets are purchased and
which sorts of liabilities are issued to ﬁnance those purchases, but also on
how the central bank’s trading proﬁts are eventually rebated to the private
sector (that is, with what delay and how distributed across the heteroge-
neous households), as a result of the speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy. The
effects will not be mechanical consequences of the change in composition
of assets in the hands of the public, but instead will result from the ﬁscal
transfers to which the transaction gives rise; it is unclear how quantita-
tively signiﬁcant such effects should be.
Indeed, leaving aside the question of whether a clear theoretical foun-
dation exists for the existence of portfolio balance effects, there is not a
great deal of empirical support for quantitatively signiﬁcant effects. The
attempt to separately target short-term and long-term interest rates under
Operation Twist in the early 1960s is generally regarded as having had a
modest effect at best on the term structure.25 The empirical literature that
has sought to estimate the effects of changes in the composition of the
public debt on relative yields has also, on the whole, found effects that are
Gauti B. Eggertsson and Michael Woodford 161
routinely observed. However, in the case of open-market operations conducted at the zero
bound, the liquidity services provided by money balances at the margin have fallen to zero,
so that an analysis of the kind proposed by Wallace is correct.
25. Okun (1963) and Modigliani and Sutch (1966) are important early discussions that
reached this conclusion. Meulendyke (1998) summarizes the literature and ﬁnds that the
predominant view is that the effect was minimal.
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son summarize their ﬁndings as follows: “It turned out that these effects
were rather small in magnitude, and that their numerical values were
highly volatile. Thus the policy conclusion to be drawn seems to be that
there is not much scope for a debt management policy aimed at systemat-
ically affecting asset yields.”27 Moreover, even if one supposes that large
enough changes in the composition of the portfolio of securities left in the
hands of the private sector can substantially affect yields, it is not clear
how relevant such an effect should be for real activity and the evolution of
goods prices. For example, James Clouse and others argue that a sufﬁ-
ciently large reduction in the number of long-term Treasuries in the hands
of the public should lower the market yield on those securities relative to
short-term rates, because certain institutions will ﬁnd it important to hold
long-term Treasury securities even when they offer an unfavorable
yield.28 But even if this is true, the fact that these institutions have idio-
syncratic reasons to hold long-term Treasuries—and that, in equilibrium,
no one else holds any or plays any role in pricing them—means that the
lower observed yield on long-term Treasuries may not correspond to any
reduction in the perceived cost of long-term borrowing for other institu-
tions. If one is able to reduce the long-term bond rate only by decoupling
it from the rest of the structure of interest rates, and from the cost of
ﬁnancing long-term investment projects, it is unclear that such a reduction
should do much to stimulate economic activity or to halt deﬂationary
pressures.
Hence we are not inclined to suppose that our irrelevance proposition
represents so poor an approximation to reality as to deprive it of practical
relevance. Even if the effects of open-market operations under the condi-
tions the proposition describes are not exactly zero, it seems unlikely that
they should be large. In our view it is more important to note that our
162 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
26. Examples of studies ﬁnding either no effects or only quantitatively unimportant
ones include Modigliani and Sutch (1967), Frankel (1985), Agell and Persson (1992), Wal-
lace and Warner (1996), and Hess (1999). Roley (1982) and Friedman (1992) ﬁnd some-
what larger effects.
27. Agell and Persson (1992, p. 78).
28. Clouse and others (2003). Stephen G. Cecchetti (“Central Banks Have Plenty of
Ammunition,” Financial Times, March 17, 2003, p. 13) similarly argues that it should be
possible for the Federal Reserve to independently affect long-term bond yields if it is deter-
mined to do so, given that it can print money without limit to buy additional long-term
Treasuries if necessary.
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is speciﬁed in a way that implies that these open-market operations have
no consequences for interest rate policy, either immediately (which is
trivial, because it would not be possible for them to lower current interest
rates, which is the only effect that would be desired), or at any subsequent
date. We have also speciﬁed ﬁscal policy in a way that implies that the
contemplated open-market operations have no effect on the path of total
government liabilities {Dt} either, whether immediately or at any later
date. Although we think these deﬁnitions make sense, as a way of isolat-
ing the pure effects of open-market purchases of assets by the central
bank from either interest rate policy on the one hand or ﬁscal policy on
the other, those who recommend monetary expansion by the central bank
may intend for this to have consequences of one or both of these other
sorts.
For example, when it is argued that a “helicopter drop” of money into
the economy would surely stimulate nominal aggregate demand, the
thought experiment that is usually contemplated is not simply a change in
the function ψ in our policy rule equation 11. First of all, it is typically
supposed that the expansion of the money supply will be permanent. If
this is the case, then the function φ that deﬁnes interest rate policy is also
being changed, in a way that will become relevant at some future date,
when the money supply no longer exceeds the satiation level.29 Second,
the assumption that the money supply is increased through a helicopter
drop rather than an open-market operation implies a change in ﬁscal pol-
icy as well. Such an operation would increase the value of nominal gov-
ernment liabilities, and it is generally at least tacitly assumed that this is a
permanent increase as well. Hence the experiment that is imagined is not
one that our irrelevance proposition implies should have no effect on the
equilibrium path of prices.
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29. This explains the apparent difference between our result and that obtained by Auer-
bach and Obstfeld (2003) in a similar model. These authors assume explicitly that an
increase in the money supply at a time when the zero bound binds carries with it the impli-
cation of a permanently larger money supply, and that there exists a future date at which the
zero bound ceases to bind, so that the larger money supply will imply a different interest
rate policy at that later date. Clouse and others (2003) also stress that maintenance of the
larger money supply until a date at which the zero bound would not otherwise bind repre-
sents one straightforward channel through which open-market operations while the zero
bound is binding could have a stimulative effect, although they discuss other possible chan-
nels as well.
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rect private sector understanding of the central bank’s commitments
regarding future policy. Such understanding may be lacking. We have just
argued that the key to lowering long-term interest rates, in a way that
actually provides an incentive for increased spending, is to change expec-
tations regarding the likely future path of short-term rates, rather than
through intervention in the market for long-term Treasuries. As a matter
of logic, this need not require any open-market purchases of long-term
Treasuries at all. Nonetheless, the private sector may be uncertain about
the nature of the central bank’s policy commitment, and so it may scruti-
nize the bank’s current actions for further clues. In practice, the manage-
ment of private sector expectations is an art of considerable subtlety, and
shifts in the portfolio of the central bank could be of some value in mak-
ing credible to the private sector the central bank’s own commitment to a
particular kind of future policy, as we discuss further in the penultimate
section of the paper. Signaling effects of this kind are often argued to be
an important reason for the effectiveness of interventions in foreign-
exchange markets, and they might well provide a justiﬁcation for open-
market operations when the zero bound binds.30
We do not wish, then, to argue that asset purchases by the central bank
are necessarily pointless under the circumstances of a binding zero lower
bound on short-term nominal interest rates. However, we do think it
important to observe that, insofar as such actions can have any effect, it is
not because of any necessary or mechanical consequence of the shift in
the portfolio of assets in the hands of the private sector itself. Instead, any
effect of such actions must be due to the way in which they change expec-
tations regarding future interest rate policy or, perhaps, the future path of
total nominal government liabilities. Later we discuss reasons why open-
market purchases by the central bank might plausibly have consequences
for expectations of these types. But because it is only through effects on
expectations regarding future policy that these actions can matter, we
focus our attention on the question of what kind of commitments regard-
ing future policy are in fact to be desired. And this question can be
addressed without explicit consideration of the role of central bank open-
market operations of any kind. Hence we will simplify our model—
164 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
30. Clouse and others (2003) argue that this is one important channel through which
open-market operations can be effective.
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bilities altogether—and instead consider what is the desirable conduct of
interest rate policy, and what kind of commitments about this policy are
desirable to make in advance.
How Severe a Constraint Is the Zero Bound?
We turn now to the question of how the existence of the zero bound
restricts the degree to which a central bank’s stabilization objectives, with
regard to both inﬂation and real activity, can be achieved, even under
ideal policy. The discussion in the previous section established that the
zero bound does represent a genuine constraint. It is not true that equilib-
ria that cannot be achieved through a suitable interest rate policy can
somehow be achieved through other means, and the zero bound does limit
the set of possible equilibrium paths for prices and output, although the
quantitative importance of this constraint remains to be seen. 
Nonetheless, we will see that it is not at all the case that a central bank
can do nothing to mitigate the severity of the destabilizing impact of the
zero bound. The reason is that inﬂation and output do not depend solely
on the current level of short-term nominal interest rates, or even solely on
the history of such rates up until the present (so that the current level of
interest rates would be the only thing that could possibly change in
response to an unanticipated disturbance). The expected character of
future interest rate policy is also a critical determinant of the degree to
which the central bank achieves its stabilization objectives, and this
allows important scope for policy to be improved upon, even when there
is little choice about the current level of short-term interest rates. 
In fact, the management of expectations is the key to successful mone-
tary policy at all times, not just in those relatively unusual circumstances
when the zero bound is reached. The effectiveness of monetary policy has
little to do with the direct effect of changing the level of overnight interest
rates, since the current cost of maintaining cash balances overnight is of
fairly trivial signiﬁcance for most business decisions. What actually mat-
ters is the private sector’s anticipation of the future path of short-term
rates, because this determines equilibrium long-term interest rates as well
as equilibrium exchange rates and other asset prices—all of which are
quite relevant for many current spending decisions, and hence for optimal
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because of the signals that such management gives about how the private
sector can expect them to be managed in the future. But there is no reason
to suppose that expectations regarding future monetary policy, and hence
regarding the future paths of nominal variables more generally, should
change only insofar as the current level of overnight interest rates
changes. A situation in which there is no decision to be made about the
current level of overnight rates (as in Japan at present) is one that gives
urgency to the question of what expectations regarding future policy one
should wish to create, but this is in fact the correct way to think about
sound monetary policy at all times.
Of course, the question of what future policy one should wish people to
expect does not arise if current constraints leave no possibility of commit-
ting oneself to a different sort of policy in the future than one would oth-
erwise have pursued. This means that the private sector must be
convinced that the central bank will not conduct policy in a way that is
purely forward looking, that is, taking account at each point in time only
of the possible paths that the economy could follow from that date
onward. For example, we will show that it is undesirable for the central
bank to pursue a given inﬂation target, once the zero bound is expected no
longer to prevent that target from being achieved, even in the case that the
pursuit of this target would be optimal if the zero bound did not exist (or
would never bind under an optimal policy). The reason is that an expecta-
tion that the central bank will pursue the ﬁxed inﬂation target after the
zero bound ceases to bind gives people no reason to hold the kind of
expectations, while the bound is binding, that would mitigate the distor-
tions created by it. A history-dependent inﬂation target31—if the central
bank’s commitment to it can be made credible—can instead yield a supe-
rior outcome.
But this, too, is an important feature of optimal policy rules more gen-
erally.32 Hence the analytical framework and institutional arrangements
used in making monetary policy need not be changed in any fundamental
way in order to deal with the special problems created by a liquidity trap.
As we explain later in the paper, the optimal policy in the case of a bind-
ing zero bound can be implemented through a targeting procedure that
166 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
31. As we will show, it is easier to explain the nature of the optimal commitment if it is
described as a history-dependent price-level target.
32. See, for example, Woodford (forthcoming, chapter 7).
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mal even if the zero bound were expected never to bind.
Feasible Responses to Fluctuations in the Natural Rate of Interest
In order to characterize how stabilization policy is constrained by the
zero bound, we make use of a log-linear approximation to the structural
equations presented in the previous section, of a kind that is often
employed in the literature on optimal monetary stabilization policy.33
Speciﬁcally, we log-linearize the structural equations of our model
(except for the zero bound in expression 4) around the paths of inﬂation,
output, and interest rates associated with a zero-inﬂation steady state, in
the absence of disturbances ( t = 0). We choose to expand around these
particular paths because the zero-inﬂation steady state represents optimal
policy in the absence of disturbances.34 In the event of small enough dis-
turbances, optimal policy will still involve paths in which inﬂation, out-
put, and interest rates are at all times close to those of the zero-inﬂation
steady state. Hence an approximation to our equilibrium conditions that is
accurate in the case of inﬂation, output, and interest rates near those val-
ues will allow an accurate approximation to the optimal responses to dis-
turbances in the case that the disturbances are small enough. 
In the zero-inﬂation steady state, it is easily seen that the real rate of
interest is equal to r
– ≡ β–1 – 1 > 0; this is also the steady-state nominal
interest rate. Hence, in the case of small enough disturbances, optimal
policy will involve a nominal interest rate that is always positive, and the
zero bound will not be a binding constraint. (Optimal policy in this case is
characterized in the references cited in the previous paragraph.) However,
we are interested in the case in which disturbances are at least occasion-
ally large enough for the zero bound to bind, that is, to prevent attainment
of the outcome that would be optimal in the absence of such a bound. It is
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33. See, for example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999); Woodford (forthcoming).
34. See Woodford (forthcoming, chapter 7) for more detailed discussion of this point.
The fact that zero inﬂation, rather than mild deﬂation, is optimal depends on our abstracting
from transactions frictions, as discussed further in footnote 40 below. As Woodford shows,
a long-run inﬂation target of zero is optimal in this model, even when the steady-state out-
put level associated with zero inﬂation is suboptimal, owing to market power. The reason is
that a commitment to inﬂation in some period t results both in increased output in period t
and in reduced output in period t – 1 (owing to the effect of expected inﬂation on the aggre-
gate supply relation, equation 25 below); because of discounting, the second effect on wel-
fare fully offsets the beneﬁt of the ﬁrst effect.
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approximation to the structural equations in the case where the lower
bound on nominal interest is assumed to be not much below r
–. We can
arrange for this gap to be as small as we may wish, without changing
other crucial parameters of the model such as the assumed rate of time
preference, by supposing that interest is paid on the monetary base at a
rate im ≥ 0 that cannot (for some institutional reason) be reduced. Then the
lower bound on interest rates actually becomes
We will characterize optimal policy subject to a constraint of the form of
expression 23, in the case that both a bound on the amplitude of distur-




– – im)/(1 + r
–) > 0 are small enough. Specifically, both our structural
equations and our characterization of the optimal responses of inflation,
output, and interest rates to disturbances will be required to be exact only
up to a residual of order O(|| ; δ
–
||2): We then hope (without here seeking
to verify) that our characterization of optimal policy in the case of a
small opportunity cost of holding money and small disturbances is not
too inaccurate in the case of an opportunity cost of several percentage
points (the case in which im = 0) and disturbances large enough to cause
the natural rate of interest to vary by several percentage points (as will be
required in order for the zero bound to bind).
As Woodford has shown elsewhere,35 the log-linear approximate equi-
librium relations may be summarized by two equations each period: a
forward-looking “IS relation”
and a forward-looking “AS relation” (or New Keynesian Phillips curve)
Here πt ≡ log(Pt/Pt–1) is the inﬂation rate, xt is a welfare-relevant output
gap, and it is now the continuously compounded nominal interest rate,
corresponding to log (1 + it) in the notation used in the previous section.
() . 25 1 πκ β π ttt t t xE u =+ + +
() – ( –– ), 24 11 xE x iE r tt t t t tt
n = ++ σπ
() . 23 ii t
m ≥
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35. Woodford (forthcoming).
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t are composite exogenous disturbance terms that shift
the two equations; the former is commonly referred to as a cost-push dis-
turbance, whereas the latter indicates exogenous variation in the Wicksel-
lian natural rate of interest, that is, the equilibrium real rate of interest in
the case that output growth is at all times equal to its natural rate. The
coefﬁcients σ and κ are both positive, and 0 < β < 1 is again the utility dis-
count factor of the representative household.
Equation 24 is a log-linear approximation to equation 2, whereas
equation 25 is derived by log-linearizing equations 7 through 9 and then
eliminating log (pt */Pt). We omit the log-linear version of the money
demand relation in expression 3, because here we are interested solely in
characterizing the possible equilibrium paths of inflation, output, and
interest rates, and we may abstract from the question of what might be
the required path for the monetary base that is associated with any such
equilibrium. (It suffices that there exist a monetary base that will satisfy
the money demand relation in each case, and this will be true as long as
the interest rate bound is satisfied.) The other equilibrium requirements
of the earlier discussion can be ignored in the case that we are interested
only in possible equilibria that remain forever near the zero-inflation
steady state, because they are automatically satisfied in that case. Equa-
tions 24 and 25 represent a pair of equations each period to determine
inflation and the output gap, given the central bank’s interest rate policy.
We will seek to compare alternative possible paths for inflation, the out-
put gap, and the nominal interest rate that satisfy these two log-linear
equations together with expression 23. Note that our conclusions will be
identical (up to a scale factor) in the event that we multiply the amplitude
of the disturbances and the steady-state opportunity cost δ
–
by any com-
mon factor; alternatively, if we measure the amplitude of disturbances in
units of δ
–
, our results will be independent of the value of δ
–
(to the extent
that our log-linear approximation remains valid). Hence we choose the
normalization δ
–
= 1 – β, corresponding to im = 0, to simplify the presen-
tation. In that case the lower bound for the nominal interest rate is again
given by expression 4.
Deﬂation under Forward-Looking Policy
We begin by considering the degree to which the zero bound impedes
the achievement of the central bank’s stabilization objectives in the case
Gauti B. Eggertsson and Michael Woodford 169
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 169that the bank pursues a strict inﬂation target. We interpret this as a com-
mitment to adjust the nominal interest rate so that
each period, insofar as it is possible to achieve this with some nonnega-
tive interest rate. It is easy to verify, by the IS and AS equations above,
that a necessary condition for this target to be satisﬁed is
When inﬂation is on target, the real interest rate is equal to the natural real
rate at all times, and the output gap is at its long-run level. The zero
bound, however, prevents equation 27 from holding if rn
t < –π*. Thus, if
the natural rate of interest is low, the zero bound frustrates the central
bank’s ability to implement an inﬂation target. Suppose the inﬂation tar-
get is zero, so that π* = 0. Then the zero bound is binding if the natural
rate of interest is negative, and the central bank is unable to achieve its
inﬂation target.
To illustrate this, consider the following experiment. Suppose the nat-
ural rate of interest is unexpectedly negative in period 0 and reverts back
to its steady-state value r
– > 0 with a ﬁxed probability in every period. Fig-
ure 2 shows the state-contingent paths of the output gap and inﬂation
under these circumstances for each of three different possible inﬂation
targets π*. We assume in period 0 that the natural rate of interest becomes
–2 percent a year and then reverts back to the steady-state value of +4 per-
cent a year with a probability of 0.1 each quarter. Thus the natural rate of
interest is expected to be negative for ten quarters on average at the time
the shock occurs.
The dashed lines in ﬁgure 2 show the state-contingent paths of the out-
put gap and inﬂation if the central bank targets zero inﬂation.36 Starting
() * . 27 ir tt
n =+ π
() * 26 ππ t =
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36. In our numerical analysis, we interpret periods as quarters, and we assume coefﬁ-
cient values of σ=0.5, κ = 0.02, and β = 0.99. The assumed value of the discount factor
implies a long-run real rate of interest r ¯ equal to 4 percent a year. The assumed value of κ is
consistent with the empirical estimate of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). The assumed
value of σ represents a relatively low degree of interest sensitivity of aggregate expendi-
ture. We prefer to bias our assumptions in the direction of only a modest effect of interest
rates on the timing of expenditure, so as not to exaggerate the size of the output contraction
that is predicted to result from an inability to lower interest rates when the zero bound
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Figure 2. State-Contingent Responses of Inﬂation and the Output Gap to a Shock to
the Natural Rate of Interest under Strict Inﬂation Targetinga
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. The targeted rate of inﬂation is designated by π*. Each upward-sloping line represents the response of inﬂation or the output
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the natural rate of interest returns to the steady state in period 1, the next
line if it returns in period 2, and so on. The inability of the central bank to
set a negative nominal interest rate results in a 14 percent output gap and
10 percent annual deﬂation. The fact that in each quarter there is a 90 per-
cent chance of the natural rate of interest remaining negative for the next
quarter creates the expectation of future deﬂation and a continued nega-
tive output gap, which creates even further deﬂation. Even if the central
bank lowers the short-term nominal interest rate to zero, the real rate of
return is positive, because the private sector expects deﬂation. 
The shaded lines in ﬁgure 2 show the equilibrium that prevails if the
central bank instead sets a 1 percent annual inﬂation target. In this case
the private sector expects 1 percent inﬂation once the economy is out of
the liquidity trap. This, however, is not enough to offset the –2 percent
natural rate of interest, so that in equilibrium the private sector expects
deﬂation instead of inﬂation. The result of this and a negative natural rate
of interest is 4 percent annual deﬂation (when the natural rate of interest is
negative) and an output gap of 7 percent.
Finally, the solid horizontal line shows the evolution of output and
inﬂation in the case where the central bank targets 2 percent annual inﬂa-
tion. In this case the central bank can satisfy equation 4 even when the nat-
ural rate of interest is negative. When the natural rate of interest is
–2 percent, the central bank lowers the nominal interest rate to zero. Since
the inﬂation target is 2 percent, the real rate is –2 percent, which is enough
to close the output gap and keep inﬂation on target. If the inﬂation target is
high enough, therefore, the central bank is able to accommodate a negative
natural rate of interest. This is the argument given by Edmund Phelps,
Lawrence Summers, and Stanley Fischer for a positive inﬂation target.37
Krugman makes a similar argument and suggests more concretely that, in
1998, Japan needed a positive inﬂation target of 4 percent under its then-
current circumstances to achieve negative real rates and curb deﬂation.38
Although it is clear that commitment to a higher inﬂation target will
indeed guard against the need for an output gap in periods when the nat-
172 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
binds. As ﬁgure 2 shows, even for this value of σ, the output contraction that results from a
slightly negative value of the natural rate of interest is quite substantial.
37. Phelps (1972); Summers (1991); Fischer (1996). 
38. Krugman (1998).
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by the inﬂation, both when the natural rate of interest is negative and
under more normal circumstances as well. Hence the optimal inﬂation tar-
get (from among the strict inﬂation targeting policies just considered) will
be some value that is at least slightly positive, in order to mitigate the dis-
tortions created by the zero bound when the natural rate of interest is neg-
ative, but not so high as to keep the zero bound from ever binding (see the
table in the next section). An intermediate inﬂation target, in contrast (like
the 1 percent target considered in the ﬁgure), leads to a substantial reces-
sion when the natural rate of interest becomes negative, and chronic inﬂa-
tion at all other times. Hence no such policy allows a complete solution of
the problem posed by the zero bound in the case that the natural rate of
interest is sometimes negative.
Nor can one do better through commitment to any policy rule that is
purely forward looking in the sense discussed elsewhere by Woodford.39
A purely forward-looking policy is one under which the central bank’s
action at any time depends only on an evaluation of the possible paths for
the central bank’s target variables (here, inﬂation and the output gap) that
are possible from the current date forward, neglecting past conditions
except insofar as they constrain the economy’s possible future path. In the
log-linear model presented above, the possible paths for inﬂation and the
output gap from period t onward depend only on the expected evolution
of the natural rate of interest from period t onward. If one assumes a Mar-
kovian process for the natural rate, as in the numerical analysis above,
then any purely forward-looking policy will result in an inﬂation rate, out-
put gap, and nominal interest rate in period t that depend only on the nat-
ural rate in period t—in our numerical example, on whether the natural
rate is still negative or has already returned to its long-run steady-state
value. It is easily shown in the case of our two-state example that the
optimal state-contingent path for inflation and output from among those
with this property will be one in which the zero bound binds if and only
if the natural rate is in the low state; hence it will correspond to a strict
inflation target of the kind just considered, for some π* between zero and
2 percent.
But one can actually do considerably better, through commitment to a
history-dependent policy, in which the central bank’s actions will depend
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its stabilization goals could in principle be achieved from then on. In the
next section we characterize the optimal form of history-dependent policy
and determine the degree to which it improves upon the stabilization of
both output and inﬂation.
The Optimal Policy Commitment
We now characterize optimal monetary policy, by optimizing over the
set of all possible state-contingent paths for inﬂation, output, and the
short-term nominal interest rate consistent with the log-linearized struc-
tural relations in equations 24 and 25. It is assumed (for now) that the
expectations regarding future state-contingent policy that are required for
such an equilibrium can be made credible to the private sector. In consid-
ering the central bank’s optimization problem under the assumption that a
credible commitment is possible regarding future policy, we do not mean
to minimize the subtlety of the task of actually communicating such a
commitment to the public and making it credible. However, we do not
believe it makes sense to recommend a policy that would systematically
seek to achieve an outcome other than a rational expectations equilib-
rium. That is, we are interested in policies that will have the desired effect
even when correctly understood by the public. Optimization under the
assumption of credible commitment is simply a way of ﬁnding the best
possible rational expectations equilibrium. Once the equilibrium that one
would like to bring about has been identiﬁed, along with the interest rate
policy that it requires, one can turn to the question of how best to signal
these intentions to the public (an issue that we brieﬂy address in the
paper’s penultimate section).
We assume that the government minimizes
This loss function can be derived by a second-order Taylor expansion of
the utility of the representative household.40 The optimal program can be
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40. See Woodford (forthcoming, chapter 6) for details. This approximation applies in
the case that we abstract from monetary frictions as assumed in this section. If transactions
frictions are instead nonnegligible, the loss function should include an additional term
proportional to (it – im)2. This would indicate welfare gains from keeping nominal interest
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 174found by a Lagrangian method, extending the methods used by Richard
Clarida, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler and by Woodford to the case in
which the zero bound can sometimes bind, as shown by Taehun Jung,
Yuki Teranishi, and Tsutomu Watanabe.41 We combine the zero bound
and the IS equation to yield the following inequality:
The Lagrangian for this problem is then
Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe show that the ﬁrst-order conditions for an
optimal policy commitment are 
One cannot solve this system by applying standard solution methods for
rational expectations models, because of the complications of the nonlin-
ear constraint in equation 31. The appendix describes the numerical
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rates as close as possible to the zero bound (or, more generally, the lower bound im).
Nonetheless, because of the stickiness of prices, it would not be optimal for interest rates
to be at zero at all times, as implied by the flexible-price model discussed by Uhlig (2000).
The optimal inflation rate in the absence of shocks would be slightly negative, rather than
zero as in the “cashless” model considered in this section; but it would not be so low that
the zero bound would be reached, except in the event of temporary declines in the natural
rate of interest, as in the analysis here. Note also that equation 28 implies that the optimal
output gap is zero. More generally, there should be an output gap stabilization objective of
the form (xt – x*)2; the utility-based loss function involves x* = 0 only if one assumes the
existence of an output or employment subsidy that offsets the distortion due to the market
power of firms. However, the value of x* affects neither the optimal state-contingent paths
derived in this section, and shown in figures 3 and 4, nor the formulas given in the earlier
section for the optimal targeting rule.
41. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999); Woodford (1999; forthcoming, chapter 7); Jung,
Teranishi, and Watanabe (2001).
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results that we obtain for the particular numerical experiment considered
in the previous section.
What is apparent from the ﬁrst-order conditions is that optimal policy
is history dependent, so that the optimal choice of inﬂation, the output
gap, and the nominal interest rate depends on the past values of the
endogenous variables. This can be seen by the appearance of a lagged
value of the Lagrange multipliers in the ﬁrst-order conditions. To get a
sense of how this history dependence matters, it is useful to consider
again the numerical example shown in figure 2. Suppose the natural rate
of interest becomes negative in period 0 and then reverts to the steady
state with a fixed probability in each period. Figure 3 shows the optimal
output gap, the inflation rate, and the price level from period 0 to
period 25. As in figure 2, the separate lines in each panel show the evo-
lution of the variables in the case that the disturbances last for different
lengths of time ranging from one quarter to twenty quarters.
One observes that the optimal policy involves committing to the cre-
ation of an output boom once the natural rate again becomes positive, and
hence to the creation of future inﬂation. Such a commitment stimulates
aggregate demand and reduces deﬂationary pressure while the economy
remains in the liquidity trap, through each of several channels.
As Krugman points out,43 creating the expectation of future inﬂation
can lower real interest rates, even when nominal interest rates cannot be
reduced. In the context of Krugman’s model, it might seem that this
requires that inﬂation be promised quite quickly (that is, by the following
“period”). Our fully intertemporal model shows how even the expectation
of later inﬂation—which nominal interest rates are not expected to rise to
offset—can stimulate current demand, because in our model current
spending decisions depend on real interest rate expectations far in the
future. For the same reason, the expectation that nominal interest rates
will be kept low later, when the central bank might otherwise have raised
them, will also stimulate spending while the zero bound still binds. And
176 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
42. Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2001) discuss the solution of these equations only
for the case in which the number of periods for which the natural rate of interest will be
negative is known with certainty at the time that the disturbance occurs. Here we show how
the system can be solved in the case of a stochastic process for the natural rate of a particu-
lar kind.
43. Krugman (1998).
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 176Figure 3. Inﬂation, the Output Gap, and Prices under the Optimal Policy
Commitmenta
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 177ﬁnally, the expectation of higher future income should stimulate current
spending, in accordance with the permanent income hypothesis. In addi-
tion, prices are less likely to fall, even given the current level of real activ-
ity, to the extent that future inﬂation is expected. This reduces the
distortions created by deﬂation itself.
On the other hand, these gains from the change in expectations while
the economy is in the liquidity trap can be achieved (given rational expec-
tations on the part of the private sector) only if the central bank is
expected to actually pursue the inﬂationary policy after the natural rate
returns to its normal level. This will in turn create distortions at that later
time, and this limits the extent to which this tool is used under an optimal
policy. Hence some contraction of output and some deﬂation occur during
the time that the natural rate is negative, even under the optimal policy
commitment. 
Also, and this is a key point, although the optimal policy involves com-
mitment to a higher price level in the future, the price level will ultimately
be stabilized. This is in sharp contrast to a constant positive-inﬂation tar-
get, which would imply an ever-increasing price level. Figure 4 shows the
corresponding state-contingent nominal interest rate under the optimal
commitment and contrasts it with the evolution of the nominal interest
rate under a zero-inﬂation target. To increase inﬂation expectations in the
trap, the central bank commits to keeping the nominal interest rate at zero
after the natural rate of interest becomes positive again. In contrast, if the
central bank targets zero inﬂation, it raises the nominal interest rate as
soon as the natural rate of interest becomes positive again. The optimal
commitment is an example of history-dependent policy, in which the cen-
tral bank commits itself to raise interest rates slowly at the time the nat-
ural rate becomes positive in order to affect expectations when the zero
bound is binding.
The nature of the additional history dependence of the optimal policy
may perhaps be more easily seen if we consider the paths of inﬂation, out-
put, and interest rates under a single possible realization of the random
fundamentals. Figure 5 compares the equilibrium paths of all three vari-
ables, both under the zero-inﬂation target and under optimal policy, in the
case where the natural rate of interest is negative for ﬁfteen quarters (t = 0
through 14), but where it is not known until quarter 15 that the natural rate
will return to its normal level in that quarter. Under the optimal policy
the nominal interest rate is kept at zero for five more quarters (t = 15
178 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 178through 19), whereas it immediately returns to its long-run steady-state
level in quarter 15 under the forward-looking policy. The consequence of
the public anticipating policy of this kind is that both the contraction of
real activity and the deflation that occur under the strict inflation target
are largely avoided, as shown in the second and third panels of the figure.
Implementing Optimal Policy
We turn now to the question of how policy should be conducted in
order to bring about the optimal equilibrium characterized in the previous
section. The question of the implementation of optimal policy remains
nontrivial, even after the optimal state-contingent paths of all variables
have been identiﬁed, because in general the solution obtained for the opti-
mal state-contingent path of the policy instrument (the short-term nominal
interest rate) does not in itself represent a useful description of a policy
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Figure 4. Response of the Nominal Interest Rate under a Zero-Inﬂation Target and
under the Optimal Policy Commitment
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 5. Response of the Nominal Interest Rate, Inﬂation, and the Output Gap to a
Shock of Speciﬁc Durationa
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. Response to a fall in the natural rate of interest below zero for a period of ﬁfteen quarters.
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/18/03  16:19  Page 180rule.44 For example, in the context of the present model, a commitment to
a state-contingent nominal interest rate path, even when fully credible,
does not imply determinate rational expectations equilibrium paths for
inﬂation and output; it is instead necessary for the central bank to be com-
mitted (and be understood to be committed) to a particular way of
responding to deviations of inﬂation and the output gap from their desired
paths. Another problem is that a complete description of the optimal state-
contingent interest rate path is unlikely to be feasible. In the previous sec-
tion we showed that one can characterize (at least numerically) the
optimal state-contingent interest rate path in the case of one very particu-
lar kind of stochastic process for the natural rate of interest. But a solution
of this kind, allowing for all possible states of belief about the probabili-
ties of various future paths of the natural rate (and disturbances to the
aggregate supply relation as well), would be difﬁcult to write down, let
alone explain to the public.
Here we show that optimal policy can nonetheless be implemented
through commitment to a policy rule that speciﬁes the central bank’s
short-run targets at each point in time as a (fairly simple) function of what
has occurred before that date. How can this be done? One may be tempted
to believe that our suggested policy is not entirely realistic or operational.
Figures 3 and 4, for example, indicated that the optimal policy involves a
complicated state-contingent plan for the nominal interest rate, which
would be hard to communicate to the public. Furthermore, it may appear
that it depends on knowledge of a special statistical process for the natural
rate of interest, which is in practice hard to estimate. Our discussion of the
ﬁxed inﬂation target suggests that the effectiveness of increasing inﬂation
expectations to close the output gap depends on the difference between
the announced inﬂation target and the natural rate of interest. It may
therefore seem crucial to estimate the natural rate of interest in order to
implement the optimal policy. Below, however, we present the striking
result that the optimal policy rule can be implemented without any esti-
mate or knowledge of the statistical process for the natural rate of interest.
This is an example of a robustly optimal direct policy rule of the kind dis-
cussed by Marc Giannoni and Woodford for the case of a general class of
linear-quadratic policy problems.45 An interesting feature of the present
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44. For further discussion in a more general context, see Woodford (forthcoming,
chapter 7).
45. Giannoni and Woodford (2003).
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same spirit, in a case where not all of the relevant constraints are linear
(owing to the fact that the zero bound binds at some times and not at
others).
An Optimal Targeting Rule
To implement the rule proposed here, the central bank need only
observe the price level and the output gap. The rule suggested replicates
exactly the history dependence discussed in the last section. The rule is
implemented as follows.
First, in each and every period there is a predetermined price-level tar-
get pt*. The central bank chooses the interest rate it to achieve the target
relation
if this is possible. If it is not possible, even by lowering the nominal inter-
est rate to zero, then it = 0. Here p ˜ t is an output gap-adjusted price index,46
deﬁned by 
The target for the next period is then determined as
where ∆t is the target shortfall in period t:
It can be veriﬁed that this rule does indeed achieve the optimal commit-
ment solution. If the price-level target is not reached, because of the zero
() – ˜ . * 34 ∆tt t pp ≡
() ( )– , ** ––
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46. On the desirability of a target for this index in the case that the zero bound does not
bind, see Woodford (forthcoming, chapter 7). This would correspond to a nominal GDP tar-
get in the case that λ = κ and that the natural rate of output follows a deterministic trend.
However, the utility-based loss function derived in Woodford (forthcoming, chapter 6)
involves λ = κ/θ, where θ >1 is the elasticity of demand faced by the suppliers of differenti-
ated goods, so that the optimal weight on output is considerably less than under a nominal
GDP target. Furthermore, the welfare-relevant output gap is unlikely to correspond too
closely to deviations of real GDP from a deterministic trend.
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turn, increases inﬂation expectations further in the trap, which is exactly
what is needed to reduce the real interest rate.
Figure 6 shows how the price-level target pt* would evolve over time,
depending on the number of periods in which the natural rate of interest
remains negative, in the same numerical experiment as in ﬁgure 3. (Here
the dark lines show the evolution of the gap-adjusted price level p ˜ t, and
the shaded lines show the evolution of pt*.) One observes that the target
price level is ratcheted steadily higher during the period in which the nat-
ural rate remains negative, as the actual price level continues to fall below
the target by an increasing amount. Once the natural rate of interest
becomes positive again, the degree to which the gap-adjusted price level
undershoots the target begins to shrink, although the target often contin-
ues to be undershot (as the zero bound continues to bind) for several
more quarters. (How long this is true depends on how high the target
price level has risen relative to the actual index; it will be higher the
longer the natural rate has been negative.) As the degree of undershoot-
ing begins to shrink, the price-level target begins to fall again, as a result
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Figure 6. Responses of the Price-Level Target and the Gap-Adjusted Price Level to a
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the target can actually be hit with a nonnegative interest rate. Once the
target ceases to be undershot, it no longer changes, and the central bank
targets and achieves a new constant value for the gap-adjusted price level
p ˜ t, one slightly higher than the target in place before the disturbance
occurred.
Note that this approach to implementing optimal policy answers the
question of whether there is any point in announcing an inﬂation target (or
price-level target) if one knows that it is extremely unlikely to be
achieved in the short run, because the zero bound is likely to continue to
bind. The answer here is yes. The central bank wishes to make the private
sector aware of its commitment to the time-varying price-level target
described by equations 32 through 34, because eventually it will be able
to hit the target. The anticipation of that fact (that is, of the level that
prices will eventually reach, as a result of the policies that the bank will
follow after the natural rate of interest again becomes positive) while the
natural rate is still negative is important in mitigating the distortions
caused by the zero bound. The fact that the target is not hit immediately
should not create doubts about whether central bank announcements
regarding its target have any meaning, if it is explained that the bank is
committed to hitting the target if this is possible at a nonnegative interest
rate, so that, at each point in time, either the target will be attained or a
zero interest rate policy will be followed. The existence of the target is
relevant even when it is not being attained, because it allows the private
sector to judge how close the central bank is to a situation in which it
would feel justiﬁed in abandoning the zero interest rate policy; hence the
current gap between the actual and the target price level should shape pri-
vate sector expectations of the time when interest rates are likely to
remain low.47
Would the private sector have any reason to believe that the central
bank was serious about the price-level target, if in each period all that is
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47. An interesting feature of the optimal rule is that it involves a form of history depen-
dence that cannot be summarized solely by the past history of short-term nominal interest
rates; if the nominal interest rate has fallen to zero in the recent past, it matters to what
extent the zero bound has prevented the central bank from pursuing as stimulative a policy
as it otherwise would have. In this respect the optimal policy rule derived here is similar to
the rules advocated by Reifschneider and Williams (1999), under which the interest rate
operating at each point in time should depend on how low the central bank would have low-
ered interest rates in the past had the zero bound not prevented it.
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The best way of making a rule credible is for the central bank to conduct
policy over time in a way that demonstrates its commitment. Ideally, the
central bank’s commitment to the price-level targeting framework would
be demonstrated before the zero bound came to bind (at which time the
central bank would have frequent opportunities to show that the target did
determine its behavior). The rule proposed above is one that would be
equally optimal both under normal circumstances and in the case of the
relatively unusual kind of disturbance that causes the natural rate of inter-
est to be substantially negative.
To understand how the rule works outside of the trap, it is useful to
note that, when the nominal interest rate is positive, ∆t = 0 at all times.
The central bank should therefore demonstrate a commitment to subse-
quently undo any over- or undershooting of the price-level target. In this
case any deﬂation that occurs when the economy ﬁnds itself in a liquidity
trap should create expectations of future inﬂation, as mandated by optimal
policy. The additional term ∆t implies that, when the zero bound is bind-
ing, the central bank should raise its long-run price-level target even fur-
ther, thus increasing inﬂation expectations even more. 
It may be wondered why we discuss our proposal in terms of a (gap-
adjusted) price-level target rather than an inﬂation target. In fact, we could
equivalently describe the policy in terms of a time-varying target for the
gap-adjusted inﬂation rate π ˜ t ≡ p ˜ t – p ˜ t–1. The reason we prefer to describe
the rule as a price-level targeting rule is that the essence of the rule is eas-
ily described in those terms. As we show below, a ﬁxed target for the gap-
adjusted price level would actually represent quite a good approximation
to optimal policy, whereas a ﬁxed inﬂation target would not come close,
because it would fail to allow for any of the history dependence of policy
necessary to mitigate the distortions resulting from the zero bound.
A Simpler Proposal
One may argue that an unappealing aspect of the rule suggested above
is that it involves the term ∆t, which determines the change in the price-
level target, and is nonzero only when the zero bound is binding. Suppose
that the central bank’s commitment to a policy rule can become credible
over time only through repeated demonstrations of its commitment to act
in accordance with it. In that case the part of the rule that involves the
adjustment of the target in response to target shortfalls when the zero
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for a very long time, because the occasions when the zero bound binds
will presumably be relatively infrequent.
Fortunately, most of the beneﬁts that can be achieved in principle
through a credible commitment to the optimal targeting rule can be
achieved through commitment to a much simpler rule, which would not
involve any special provisos that are invoked only in the event of a liq-
uidity trap. Consider the following simpler rule:
where now the target for the gap-adjusted price level is ﬁxed at all times.
The advantage of this rule, although it is not fully optimal when the zero
bound is binding, is that it may be more easily communicated to the pub-
lic. Note that the simple rule is fully optimal in the absence of the zero
bound. In fact, even if the zero bound occasionally binds, this rule results
in distortions only a bit more severe than those associated with the fully
optimal policy.
Figures 7 and 8 compare the results for these two rules. The shaded
lines show the equilibrium under the constant-price-level target rule in
equation 35, whereas the dark lines show the fully optimal rule in equa-
tions 32 through 34. As the ﬁgures show, the constant-price-level target-
ing rule results in state-contingent responses of output and inﬂation that
are very close to those under the optimal commitment, even if under this
rule the price level falls further during the period when the zero bound
binds, and only asymptotically rebounds to its level before the distur-
bance. The table below shows that the simple rule already achieves most
of the welfare gain that the optimal policy achieves; the table reports the
value of expected discounted losses, as a percentage of what could be
achieved by a strict zero-inﬂation target (equation 28), conditional on the
occurrence of the disturbance in period 0, under the various policies dis-
cussed above:
Policy Loss (percent)
Strict inﬂation target, π* = 0 100
Strict inﬂation target, π* = 1 24.1
Strict inﬂation target, π* = 2 32
Constant price-level target 0.0725
Optimal rule 0.036
() * , 35 px p tt +=
λ
κ
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1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 186Figure 7. Responses of Inﬂation and the Output Gap under the Optimal Targeting
Rule and under the Simple Rulea
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 8. Responses of the Nominal Interest Rate and Prices under the Optimal
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any of the strict inﬂation targets. Although it is true that losses remain
twice as large under the simple rule as under the optimal rule, they are
nonetheless fairly small.
As with the fully optimal rule, no estimate of the natural rate of interest
is needed to implement the constant-price-level targeting rule. It may
seem puzzling at ﬁrst that a constant-price-level targeting rule does well,
because no account is taken of the size of the disturbance to the natural
rate of interest. This comes about because a price-level target commits the
government to undo any deﬂation with subsequent inﬂation; a larger dis-
turbance, which creates a larger initial deﬂation, automatically creates
greater inﬂation expectations in response. Thus an automatic stabilizer is
built into the price-level target, which is lacking under a strict inﬂation
targeting regime.48
A proper strategy for the central bank to use in communicating its
objectives and targets when outside the liquidity trap is of crucial impor-
tance for this policy rule to be successful. To see this, consider a rule that
is equivalent to equation 35 when the zero bound is not binding. Taking
the difference of equation 35, we obtain
Although this rule results in an equilibrium identical to that under the
constant-price-level targeting rule when the zero bound is not binding, the
result is dramatically different when the zero bound is binding, because
this rule implies that the inﬂation rate is proportional to the negative of the
growth rate of output. Thus it mandates deﬂation when there is growth in
the output gap. This implies that the central bank will deﬂate once the
economy is out of a liquidity trap, because the economy will then be in a
period of output growth. This is exactly the opposite of what is optimal, as
we have observed above. Thus the outcome under this rule is even worse
than under a strict zero-inﬂation target, even if this rule replicates the
price-level targeting rule when out of the trap. What this underlines is that
it is not enough to replicate the equilibrium behavior that corresponds to
() (– ). – 36 0 1 π
λ
κ
tt t xx +=
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48. Wolman (forthcoming) also stresses this advantage of rules that incorporate a
price-level target over rules that only respond to the inﬂation rate, such as a conventional
Taylor rule.
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 189equation 35 in normal times to induce the correct set of expectations when
the zero bound is binding. It is crucial to communicate to the public that
the government is committed to a long-run price-level target. This com-
mitment is exactly what creates the desired inﬂation expectations when
the zero bound is binding.
Should the Central Bank Keep Some Powder Dry?
Thus far we have considered only alternative policies that might be
followed after the natural rate of interest has unexpectedly fallen to a
negative value, causing the zero bound to bind. A question of consider-
able current interest in countries like the United States, however, is how
policy should be affected by the anticipation that the zero bound might
well bind before long, even if it is not yet binding. Some have argued that,
in such circumstances, the Federal Reserve should be cautious about low-
ering interest rates all the way to zero too soon, in order to save its ammu-
nition for future emergencies. This suggests that the anticipation that the
zero bound could bind in the near future should lead to tighter policy than
would otherwise be justiﬁed given current conditions. Others argue, how-
ever, that policy should instead be more inﬂationary than one might oth-
erwise prefer, to reduce the probability that a further negative shock will
result in a binding zero bound.
Our characterization of the optimal targeting rule can shed light on this
debate. Recall that the rule laid out in equations 32 through 34 describes
optimal policy regardless of the assumed stochastic process for the nat-
ural rate of interest, and not only in the case of the particular two-state
Markov process assumed in ﬁgure 3. In particular, the same rule is opti-
mal in the case that information is received indicating the likelihood of
the natural rate of interest becoming negative before this actually occurs.
How should that news affect the conduct of policy? Under the optimal tar-
geting rule, the optimal target for p ˜t is unaffected by such expectations, as
long as the zero bound is not yet binding, because only target shortfalls
that have already occurred can justify a change in the target value pt*.
Thus an increased assessment of the likelihood of a binding zero bound
over the coming year or two would not be a reason for increasing the
price-level target (or the implied target rate of inﬂation).49
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49. This conclusion, however, is likely to depend on a relatively special feature of our
model, namely, the fact that our target variables (inﬂation and the output gap) are both 
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and interest rates, even in the absence of any immediate change in the
central bank’s price-level target, owing to the effect on forward-looking
private sector spending and pricing decisions. The anticipation of a com-
ing state in which the natural rate of interest will be negative, and actual
interest rates will not be able to fall as much, owing to the zero bound,
will reduce both desired real expenditure (at unchanged short-term inter-
est rates) and desired price increases, because of the anticipation of nega-
tive output gaps and price declines in the future. This change in the
behavior of the private sector’s outlook will require a change in the cen-
tral bank’s conduct of policy in order to hit its unchanged target for the
modiﬁed price level, likely in the direction of a preemptive loosening.
This is illustrated by the numerical experiment shown in figure 9. Here
we suppose that in quarter 0 both the central bank and the private sector
learn that the natural rate of interest will fall to –2 percent a year only in
period 4. It is known that the natural rate will remain at its normal level
of +4 percent a year until then; after the drop, it will return to the normal
level with a probability of 0.1 each quarter, as in the case considered ear-
lier. We now consider the character of optimal policy from period 0
onward, given this information. Figure 9 again shows the optimal state-
contingent paths of inflation and output in the case that the disturbance to
the natural rate, when it arrives, lasts for one quarter, two quarters, and
so on.
We observe that, under the optimal policy commitment, prices begin
to decline mildly as soon as the news of the coming disturbance is
received. The central bank is nonetheless able to avoid undershooting its
target for  p ˜t at first, by stimulating an increase in real activity sufficient
to justify the mild deflation. (Given the private sector’s shift to pes-
simism, this is the policy dictated by the targeting rule, given that even a
mild immediate increase in real activity is insufficient to prevent a price
decline, owing to the anticipated decline in real demand when the distur-
bance hits.) By quarter 3, however, this is no longer possible, and the
Gauti B. Eggertsson and Michael Woodford 191
purely forward-looking variables: their equilibrium values at any point in time depend (in
our simple model) only on the economy’s exogenous state and the expected conduct of pol-
icy from the current period onward. There are a variety of reasons why a more realistic
model may well imply that these variables are functions of lagged endogenous variables as
well, and hence of past policy. In such a case, the optimal target criterion will be at least
somewhat forward looking, as discussed in Giannoni and Woodford (2003).
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 191Figure 9. Responses of Inﬂation, the Output Gap, and Prices to an Anticipated Shock
under Optimal Policya
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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decline), even though the nominal interest rate is at zero. Thus, optimal
policy involves driving the nominal interest rate to zero even before the
natural rate of interest has turned negative, when that development can
already be anticipated for the near future. The fact that the zero bound
binds even before the natural rate of interest becomes negative means
that the price-level target is higher than it otherwise would have been
when the disturbance to the natural rate arrives. As a result, deflation and
the output gap during the period when the natural rate is negative are less
severe than in the case where the disturbance is unanticipated. Optimal
policy in this scenario is somewhat more inflationary after the distur-
bance occurs than in the case considered in figure 3, because in this case
the optimal policy commitment takes into account the contractionary
effects, in periods before the disturbance takes effect, of the anticipation
that the disturbance will result in price-level and output declines. The
fact that optimal policy after the disturbance occurs is different in this
case, despite the fact that the disturbance has exactly the same effects as
before from quarter 4 onward, is another illustration of the history depen-
dence of optimal policy. 
Preventing a Self-Fulﬁlling Deﬂationary Trap
Our analysis thus far has assumed that the real disturbance that results
in a negative natural rate of interest does so only temporarily. We have
therefore supposed that price-level stabilization will eventually be consis-
tent with positive nominal interest rates and, accordingly, that a time will
foreseeably be reached when the central bank can create inﬂation by
keeping short-term nominal rates at a low but nonnegative level. But is it
possible for the zero bound to bind forever in equilibrium, not because of
a permanently negative natural rate, but simply because deﬂation contin-
ues to be (correctly) expected indeﬁnitely? If so, the central bank’s com-
mitment to a nondecreasing price-level target might seem irrelevant; the
price level would fall further and further short of the target, but because of
the binding zero bound, the central bank could never do anything about it.
In the model presented in the ﬁrst part of the paper, a self-fulﬁlling,
permanent deﬂation is indeed consistent with both the Euler equation
(equation 2) for aggregate expenditure, the money-demand relation
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that, from some date τ onward, all disturbances  t = 0 with certainty,
so that the natural rate of interest is expected to take the constant value
r
– =β –1 – 1 > 0, as in the scenarios considered earlier in the paper. Then the
possible paths for inﬂation, output, and interest rates consistent with each
of the relations just listed in all periods t ≥τare given by
where Y ˜ < Y
–
is implicitly deﬁned by the relation
Note that this deﬂationary path is consistent with monetary policy as long
as real balances satisfy Mt/Pt ≥ m –(Y ˜; 0) each period; faster growth of the
money supply does nothing to prevent consistency of this path with the
requirement that money supply equal money demand in each period.
There remains, however, one further requirement for equilibrium in the
earlier model, namely, the transversality condition (equation 6) or, equiv-
alently, the requirement that households hit their intertemporal budget
constraint. Whether the deﬂationary path is consistent with this condition
as well depends, properly speaking, on the speciﬁcation of ﬁscal policy: it
is a matter of whether the government budget results in contraction of the
nominal value of total government liabilities Dt at a sufﬁcient rate asymp-
totically. Under some assumptions about the character of ﬁscal policy,
such as the Ricardian ﬁscal policy rule assumed by Jess Benhabib,
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, and Martin Uribe,50 the nominal value of gov-
ernment liabilities will necessarily contract as the price level falls, so that
equation 6 is also satisﬁed, and the processes described above will indeed
represent a rational expectations equilibrium. In such a case, then, a com-
mitment to the price-level targeting rule proposed in the previous section
will be equally consistent with more than one equilibrium: if people
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50. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001). 
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indeed be an equilibrium, but if they expect perpetual deﬂation, that will
be an equilibrium as well.
However, this outcome can be excluded through a suitable commit-
ment with regard to the asymptotic evolution of total government liabili-
ties. Essentially, there needs to be a commitment to policies that ensure
that the nominal value of government liabilities cannot contract at the rate
required for satisfaction of the transversality condition, despite perpetual
deﬂation. One example of a commitment that would sufﬁce is a commit-
ment to a balanced-budget policy of the kind analyzed by Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe.51 These authors show that self-fulﬁlling deﬂations are not pos-
sible when monetary policy is committed to a Taylor rule and the govern-
ment to a balanced budget. The key to their result is that the ﬁscal rule
includes a commitment that is as binding against running large surpluses
as it is against running large deﬁcits; then the nominal value of govern-
ment liabilities cannot contract, even when the price level falls exponen-
tially forever.
The credibility of this sort of ﬁscal commitment might be doubted, and
so another way of maintaining a ﬂoor under the asymptotic nominal value
of total government liabilities is through a commitment not to contract the
monetary base, together with a commitment of the government to main-
tain a nonnegative asymptotic present value of the public debt. In particu-
lar, suppose that the central bank commits itself to follow a base-supply
rule of the form
in each period when the zero bound binds (that is, when it is not possible
to hit the price-level target with a positive nominal interest rate), where
is the current price-level target implied by the adjusted price-level target
pt*. When the zero bound does not bind, the monetary base is whatever
level is demanded at the nominal interest rate required to hit the price-
level target. This is a rule in the same spirit as equation 11, specifying a
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binds, but letting the monetary base be endogenously determined by the
central bank’s other targets at other times. Equation 37 is a more compli-
cated formula than is necessary to make our point, but it has the advan-
tage of making the monetary base a continuous function of other
aggregate state variables at the point where the zero bound just ceases to
bind.
This particular form of commitment has the advantage that it may be
considered less problematic for the central bank to commit itself to main-
tain a particular nominal value for its liabilities than for the public trea-
sury to do so. It can also be justiﬁed as entirely consistent with the central
bank’s commitment to the price-level targeting rule; even when the target
cannot be hit, the central bank supplies the quantity of money that would
be demanded if the price level were at the target. Doing so—refusing to
contract the monetary base even in a deﬂation—is a way of signaling to
the public that the central bank is serious about its intention to see the
price level restored to the target level.
If one then assumes a ﬁscal commitment that guarantees that
that is, that the government will asymptotically be neither creditor nor
debtor, the transversality condition reduces to
In the case of the base-supply rule in equation 37, this condition is vio-
lated in the candidate equilibrium described above, since the price-level
and output paths speciﬁed would imply that
where the last inequality makes use of the fact that, under the price-level
targeting rule, {pt*} is a nondecreasing series. Note that the ﬁnal expres-
sion on the right-hand side is independent of T, for all dates T ≥τ . Hence
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fulﬁlling deﬂation of the sort described above as a rational expectations
equilibrium. It follows that there is a possible role for quantitative
easing—understood to mean the supply of base money beyond the mini-
mum quantity required for consistency with the zero nominal interest
rate—as an element of an optimal policy commitment. A commitment to
supply base money in proportion to the target price level, and not the
actual current price level, when the zero bound prevents the central bank
from hitting its price-level target, can be desirable both as a way of ruling
out self-fulﬁlling deﬂations and as a way of signaling the central bank’s
continuing commitment to the price-level target, even though it is tem-
porarily unable to hit it.
Note that this result does not contradict our irrelevance proposition,
because here we have made a different assumption about the nature of the
ﬁscal commitment. Equation 38 implies that the evolution of total nomi-
nal government liabilities will not be independent of the central bank’s
target for the monetary base. As a consequence, the neutrality proposition
no longer holds. The import of that proposition is that expansion of the
monetary base when the economy is in a liquidity trap is necessarily
pointless; rather, any effect of such action must depend either on chang-
ing expectations regarding future interest rate policy or  on changing
expectations regarding the future path of total nominal government liabil-
ities. The present discussion has illustrated circumstances in which
expansion of the monetary base—or, at any rate, a commitment not to
contract it—could serve both these ends.
Nonetheless, the present discussion does not support the view that the
central bank should be able to hit its price-level target at all times, simply
by ﬂooding the economy with as much base money as is required to pre-
vent the price level from falling below the target at any time. Our earlier
analysis still describes all possible paths for the price level consistent with
rational expectations equilibrium, and we have seen that even if the cen-
tral bank were able to choose the expectations that the private sector
should have (as long as it were willing to act in accordance with them),
the zero bound would prevent it from being able to fully stabilize inﬂation
and the output gap. Furthermore, the degree of monetary base expansion
during a liquidity trap called for by the rule in equation 37 is quite mod-
est. The monetary base will be raised gradually, if the zero bound contin-
ues to bind, as the price-level target is ratcheted up to steadily higher
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cally involve only a very modest increase in the monetary base, even if
the liquidity trap lasts for several years. There would be no obvious bene-
ﬁt to the kind of rapid expansion of the monetary base actually tried in
Japan over the past two years. Such an expansion is evidently not justiﬁed
by any intention regarding the future price level, and hence regarding the
size of the monetary base once Japan exits from the trap. But an injection
of base money that is expected to be removed once the zero bound ceases
to bind should have little effect on spending or pricing behavior, as we
showed in the ﬁrst section of the paper.
Further Aspects of the Management of Expectations
In the ﬁrst section we argued that neither expansion of the monetary
base as such nor open-market purchases of particular types of assets
should have any effect on either inﬂation or real activity, except to the
extent that these actions might change expectations regarding future inter-
est rate policy (or possibly expectations regarding the asymptotic behav-
ior of total nominal government liabilities, and hence the question of
whether the transversality condition should be satisﬁed). This then
allowed us to characterize the optimal policy commitment without any
reference to the use of such instruments of policy; a consideration of the
different possible joint paths of interest rates, inﬂation, and output that
would be consistent with rational expectations equilibrium sufﬁced to
allow us to determine the best possible equilibrium that one could hope to
arrange, and to characterize it in terms of the interest rate policy that one
should wish the private sector to expect.
However, this does not mean that other aspects of policy—beyond a
mere announcement of the rule to which the central bank wishes to be
understood to be committed in setting future interest rate policy—cannot
matter. They may matter insofar as certain kinds of present actions may
help to signal the bank’s intentions regarding future policy, or make it
more credible that the central bank will indeed carry out those intentions.
A full analysis of the ways in which policy actions may be justiﬁed as
helping to steer expectations is beyond the scope of this paper, and in any
event the question is one that has as much to do with psychology and
effective communication as with economic analysis. Nonetheless, we
198 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 198offer a few remarks here about the kinds of policies that might contribute
to the creation of desirable expectations.
Demonstrating Resolve
One way in which current actions may help to create desirable expec-
tations regarding future policy is by being seen to be consistent with the
principles that the central bank wishes the private sector to understand
will guide that policy. We have already mentioned one example of this:
one way to convince the private sector that the central bank will follow
the optimal price-level targeting rule after a period in which the zero
bound has been hit is by following this rule before such a situation arises.
Our discussion in the previous section provides a further example.
Adjustment of the supply of base money while the zero bound is binding,
so as to keep the monetary base proportional to the target price level
rather than the actual current price level, can be helpful, even though irrel-
evant to interest rate control, as a way of communicating to the private
sector the central bank’s belief about where the price level ought properly
to be (and hence the quantity of base money that the economy ought to
need). By putting the existence of the price-level target in greater relief,
such an action can help create the expectations regarding future interest
rate policy necessary to mitigate the distortions created by the binding
zero bound. 
As a further example, Clouse and others argue that open-market opera-
tions may be stimulative, even when the zero bound has been reached,
because they “demonstrate resolve” to keep the nominal interest rate at
zero for a longer time than would otherwise be expected.52 But an expan-
sion of the monetary base when the zero bound is binding need not be
interpreted in this way. Consider, for example, a central bank with a con-
stant zero inﬂation target, as discussed previously. When the zero bound
binds, such a bank is unable to hit its inﬂation target and should exhibit
frustration with this state of affairs. If some within the bank believe it
should always be possible to hit the target with sufﬁciently vigorous
monetary expansion, one might well observe substantial growth in the
monetary base at a time when the inﬂation target is being undershot.
Nonetheless, this would not imply any commitment to looser policy
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monetary base to be higher than required to hit the inﬂation target, if the
target can be hit. The result should be the equilibrium path shown in ﬁg-
ure 2, and there should be no effect from the quantitative easing that occurs
while the zero bound binds. This shows that it matters what the private sec-
tor understands to be the principle that motivates quantitative easing; it is
not simply a question of how large is the increase in the monetary base.
Similarly, open-market purchases of long-term treasury bonds when
short-term rates are at zero, as advocated by Ben Bernanke and Stephen
Cecchetti,53 among others, may well have a stimulative effect even if
portfolio balance effects are quantitatively unimportant. We argued
previously that under such circumstances it is desirable for the central
bank to commit itself to maintain low short-term rates even after the nat-
ural rate of interest rises again. The level of long-term rates can indicate
the extent to which the markets actually believe such a commitment. If a
central bank’s judgment is that long-term rates remain higher than they
should be under the optimal equilibrium, owing to private sector skepti-
cism about whether the history-dependent interest rate policy will actu-
ally be followed, then a willingness to buy long-term bonds from the
private sector at a price it regards as more appropriate is one way for the
central bank to demonstrate publicly that it expects to carry out its com-
mitment regarding future interest rate policy. Given that the private sec-
tor is likely to be uncertain about the nature of the central bank’s
commitment (in the case of imperfect credibility), and that it can reason-
ably assume that the central bank knows more about its own degree of
resolve than others do, action by the central bank that is consistent with a
belief on its own part that it will keep short-term rates low in the future is
likely to shift private beliefs in the same direction. If so, open-market
purchases of long-term bonds could lower long-term interest rates, stim-
ulate the economy immediately, and bring the economy closer to the
optimal rational expectations equilibrium. However, that effect follows
not from the purchases themselves, but from how they are interpreted.
For them to be interpreted as indicating a particular kind of commitment
with regard to future policy, it is important that the central bank have
itself formulated such an intention, and that it so inform the public, so
that its open-market purchases will be seen in this light.
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Svensson that purchases of foreign exchange be used to stimulate the
economy through devaluation of the currency.54 Under the optimal policy
commitment described in an earlier section, a decline in the natural rate of
interest should be accompanied by depreciation of the currency, both
because nominal interest rates fall (and are expected to remain low for
some time) and because the expected long-run price level (and hence the
expected long-run nominal exchange rate) should increase. It follows that
the extent to which the currency depreciates can provide an indicator of
the extent to which the markets believe that the central bank is committed
to such an optimal policy; and if the depreciation is insufﬁcient, purchases
of foreign exchange by the central bank provide one way for it to demon-
strate its own conﬁdence in its policy intentions. Again, the effect in ques-
tion is not a mechanical consequence of the bank’s purchases, but instead
depends on their interpretation.55
Providing Incentives to Improve Credibility
A related but somewhat distinct argument is that actions at the zero
bound may help render the central bank’s commitment to an optimal pol-
icy more credible, by providing the bank with a motive to behave in the
future in the way that it would currently wish that people would expect it
to behave. Here we brieﬂy discuss how policy actions that are possible
while the economy remains in a liquidity trap may be helpful in this
regard. Our point is not so much that the central bank is in need of a
“commitment technology” because it will be unable to resist the tempta-
tion to break its commitments later in the absence of such a constraint.
Rather, it is that the central bank may well need a way of making its com-
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the central bank will be disadvantaged later if it were to deviate from the
policy to which it wishes to commit itself can serve this purpose.
To consider what kind of current actions provide useful incentives, it is
helpful to analyze (Markov) equilibrium under the assumption that policy
is conducted by a discretionary optimizer, unable to commit to speciﬁc
future actions at all.56 Consider ﬁrst what a Markov equilibrium under dis-
cretionary optimization would be like in the case that the only policy
instrument available is a short-term nominal interest rate, whose value is
chosen each period, and the objective of the central bank is minimization
of the loss function in equation 28. As shown above, if the central bank
can credibly commit itself, this problem has a solution in which the zero
bound does not result in too serious a distortion, although it does bind.
Under the assumption of central bank discretion, however, the out-
come will be much inferior. Note that discretionary policy (under the
assumption of Markov equilibrium in the dynamic policy game) is an
example of a purely forward-looking policy. It then follows from our ear-
lier argument that the equilibrium outcome will correspond to the kind of
equilibrium discussed there in the case of a strict inﬂation target. More
speciﬁcally, it is obvious that the equilibrium is the same as under a strict
inﬂation target π* = 0, since this is the inﬂation rate that the discretionary
optimizer will choose once the natural rate of interest is again at its
steady-state level. (From that point onward, a policy of zero inﬂation
clearly minimizes the remaining terms in the discounted loss function.)
As shown in ﬁgure 2, if the private sector expects that the central bank
will behave in this fashion, and the natural rate of interest remains nega-
tive for several quarters, the result will be a deep and prolonged contrac-
tion of economic activity and a sustained deﬂation. We have also seen that
these effects could largely be avoided, even in the absence of other policy
instruments, if the central bank were able to credibly commit itself to a
history-dependent monetary policy in later periods. Thus, in the kind of
situation considered here, there is a deﬂationary bias to discretionary
monetary policy, although, at its root, the problem is again the one identi-
ﬁed in the classic analysis of Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott.57 We
now consider instead the extent to which the outcome could be improved,
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ing the nature of the policy game.
One example of a current policy action, available even when the zero
bound binds, that can help shift expectations regarding future policy in a
desirable way is for the government to cut taxes and issue additional nom-
inal debt.58 Alternatively, the tax cut can be ﬁnanced by money creation,
because when the zero bound binds, there is no difference between
expanding the monetary base and issuing additional short-term Treasury
debt at zero interest. This is essentially the kind of policy imagined when
people speak of a “helicopter drop” of additional money into the econ-
omy, but here it is the ﬁscal consequences of such an action with which
we are concerned.
Of course, if the objective of the central bank in setting monetary pol-
icy remains as assumed above, this will make no difference to the discre-
tionary equilibrium: the optimal policy once the natural rate of interest
becomes positive again will once more appear to be the immediate pursuit
of a strict zero-inﬂation target. However, if the central bank also cares
about reducing the social costs of increased taxation—whether because of
collection costs or because of other distortions—as it ought if it really
takes social welfare into account, the result is different. As Eggertsson has
shown elsewhere,59 the tax cut will then increase inﬂation expectations,
even if the government cannot commit to future policy.
It may be asked why, if such an incentive exists, Japan continues to
suffer deﬂation, given the growth in Japanese government debt during the
1990s. One possible answer is that although the gross national debt is
140 percent of GDP in Japan today, this does not reﬂect the true inﬂation
incentives of the government. The ratio of gross national debt to GDP
overestimates the government’s inﬂation incentives, because a substantial
portion of government debt is held by other government institutions.60 Net
government debt is only 67 percent of GDP, and, as a result, inﬂation
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countries.
An even more likely reason for continued low inﬂation expectations in
Japan, despite the size of the nominal public debt, is skepticism about
whether the central bank can be expected to care about reducing the
burden of the public debt when determining future monetary policy. The
public may believe that the Bank of Japan lacks such an objective; the
expressed resistance of the Bank of Japan to suggestions that it increase
its purchases of Japanese government bonds, on the ground that this could
encourage a lack of ﬁscal discipline,61 certainly suggests that reducing the
burden of government ﬁnance is not among its highest priorities. As
Eggertsson has stressed elsewhere,62 in order for ﬁscal policy to be effec-
tive as a means of increasing inﬂationary expectations, ﬁscal and mone-
tary policy must be coordinated so as to maximize social welfare. The
consequences of a narrow concern with inﬂation stabilization on the part
of the central bank, together with an inability to credibly commit future
monetary policy, can be dire, even from the point of view of the bank’s
own stabilization objectives.
Another instrument that may be used to change expectations regarding
future monetary policy is open-market purchases of real assets or foreign
exchange. Purchases of real assets (say, real estate) can be thought of as
another way of increasing nominal government liabilities, which should
affect inﬂation incentives in much the same way as deﬁcit spending.63
Purchases of real assets have the advantage of not worsening the overall
ﬁscal position of the government—a current concern in Japan, given its
existing gross debt—while still increasing the ﬁscal incentive for inﬂa-
tion. A further advantage of this approach is that it need not depend on a
perceived central bank interest in reducing the burden of the public debt.
Since the (nominal) capital gains from inﬂation accrue to the central bank
itself under this policy, the central bank may be perceived to have an
204 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2003
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ance sheet, for example because doing so will help ensure its indepen-
dence. (One can easily argue that, under a rational scheme of cooperation
between the central bank and the government, the central bank should not
choose policy on the basis of concerns about its balance sheet. But under
such an ideal regime, it should choose monetary policy with a view to
reducing the burden of the public debt, among other goals.)
The incentive effects of open-market operations in foreign exchange
are even simpler.64 Open-market purchases of foreign assets give the cen-
tral bank an incentive to inﬂate in the future in order to realize capital
gains at the expense of foreigners. These will be valuable if the central
bank cares either about its own balance sheet or about reducing the bur-
den of the public debt, as in the case of real asset purchases. However,
capital gains on foreign exchange that result from depreciation of the
domestic currency will be valuable even if the central bank cares neither
about its balance sheet (for example, because it cooperates perfectly with
the public treasury) nor about the burden of the debt (for example,
because nondistorting sources of revenue are available to the public trea-
sury). Capital gains at the expense of foreigners would allow an increase
in domestic spending, by either the government or the private sector, and
a central bank must value this if it has the national interest at heart.
Under rational expectations, of course, no such capital gains are real-
ized on average. Still, the purchase of foreign assets can work as a com-
mitment device, because if the central bank reneged on its inﬂation
commitment, it would cause capital losses if the government holds for-
eign assets. Purchases of foreign assets are thus a way of committing the
government to looser monetary policy in the future. This creates a reason
for purchasing foreign exchange in order to cause a devaluation (which
will also stimulate current demand), even without any assumption of a
deviation from interest rate parity of the kind relied upon by authors such
as McCallum in recommending devaluation for Japan.
65 Clouse and
others argue that open-market purchases of long-term Treasuries by the
Federal Reserve should also change expectations in a way that results in
immediate stimulus.66 The argument is that if the central bank were not to
follow through on its commitment to keep short-term rates low, it would
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made sense only on the assumption that it would keep interest rates low.
Similarly, Peter Tinsley has proposed a policy that would create this kind
of incentive even more directly, namely, the sale by the Federal Reserve
of options to obtain federal funds at a future date at a certain price.67 The
Federal Reserve would then stand to lose money if it did not keep the
funds rate at the level to which it had previously committed itself.
Although these proposals should also help reinforce the credibility of
the kind of policy commitment associated with the optimal equilibrium
(as characterized in the ﬁrst section of the paper), they have at least one
important disadvantage relative to purchases of real assets or of foreign
exchange. They only provide the central bank an incentive to maintain
low nominal interest rates for a certain period; they do not provide it with
an incentive to ensure that the price level eventually rises to a higher
level. Thus they may do little to counter private sector expectations that
nominal interest rates will remain low for years—but because goods
prices are going to continue to fall, not because the central bank is com-
mitted to eventual reﬂation, as in the self-fulﬁlling deﬂation trap dis-
cussed above. This is arguably the kind of expectation that has now taken
root in Japan, where even ten-year bond yields are already well below 1
percent, even though prices continue to fall and economic activity
remains anemic. Creating the perception that the central bank has an
incentive to continue trying to raise the price level, and that it will not be
content as long as nominal interest rates remain low, may be a more suc-
cessful way of generating the sort of expectations associated with the
optimal equilibrium.
Conclusion
We have argued that the key to dealing with a situation in which mon-
etary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on short-term nominal
interest rates is the skillful management of expectations regarding the
future conduct of policy. By “management of expectations” we do not
mean that the central bank should imagine that, if it uses sufﬁcient guile,
it can lead the private sector to believe whatever the central bank wishes it
to believe, no matter what it actually does. Instead we have assumed that
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expect something that the central bank does not itself intend to bring
about. But we do contend that it is highly desirable for a central bank to be
able to commit itself in advance to a course of action that is desirable
because of the beneﬁts that ﬂow from its being anticipated, and then to
work to make that commitment credible to the private sector. 
In the context of a simple optimizing model of the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism, we have shown that a purely forward-looking approach
to policy—which allows for no possibility of committing future policy to
respond to past conditions—can lead to quite bad outcomes in the event
of a temporary decline in the natural rate of interest, regardless of the kind
of policy pursued at the time of the disturbance. We have also character-
ized optimal policy, under the assumption that credible commitment is
possible, and shown that it involves a commitment to eventually bring the
general price level back up to a level even higher than would have pre-
vailed had the disturbance never occurred. Finally, we have described a
type of history-dependent price-level targeting rule with the following
properties: that a commitment to base interest rate policy on this rule
determines the optimal equilibrium, and that the same form of targeting
rule continues to describe optimal policy regardless of which of a large
number of types of disturbances may affect the economy.
Given the role of private sector anticipation of history-dependent pol-
icy in realizing a desirable outcome, it is important for central banks to
develop effective methods of signaling their policy commitments to the
private sector. An essential precondition for this, certainly, is for the cen-
tral bank itself to clearly understand the kind of history-dependent behav-
ior to which it should be seen to be committed. It can then communicate
its thinking on the matter and act consistently with the principles that it
wishes the private sector to understand. Simply conducting policy in
accordance with a rule may not sufﬁce to bring about an optimal, or
nearly optimal, equilibrium, but it is the place to start.
APPENDIX A
The Numerical Solution Method
Here we illustrate a solution method for the optimal commitment
solution discussed in the ﬁrst section of the text. This same method can
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ing the solution in the case where the central bank commits to a constant
price-level target rule or to a constant inﬂation target. We assume that the
natural rate of interest becomes unexpectedly negative in period 0 and
then reverts back to normal with probability αt in every period t. Our
numerical work assumes that there is a ﬁnal date S at which the natural
rate becomes positive with a probability of 1, although this date may be
arbitrarily far in the future.
The solution takes the form
it = 0 ∀ t if 0 ≤ t < τ + kτ
it > 0 ∀ t if t ≥ τ + kτ.
It follows that
Etxt+1 – xt +σ (Etπt+1 + r n
t) = 0i f t < τ + kτ
ϕ1t = 0i f t ≥ τ + kτ.
Here τ is the stochastic date at which the natural rate of interest returns to
the steady state. We assume that τ can take any value between 1 and the
terminal date S. The number τ+kτ is the period in which the zero bound
ceases to bind contingent on the natural rate of interest becoming positive
in period τ. Note that the value of kτ can depend on the value of τ. We will
ﬁrst show the solution for the problem as if we knew the sequence {kτ}S
τ=1.
We then describe a numerical method to ﬁnd the sequence {kτ}S
τ=1.
The Solution for t ≥   k 
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system has a unique bounded solution of the form
The Solution for   ≤ t ≤     k 
Again this is a perfect-foresight solution, but with the zero bound bind-
ing. The solution satisﬁes the following equations:
The system can be written as
This system has a solution of the form
where j = 0, 1, 2, …, k. Here  kτ–j is the coefﬁcient in the solution when
there are kτ – j periods until the zero bound stops being binding (that is,
when kτ – j = 0, the zero bound is no longer binding and the solution is
equivalent to that in equations A2 and A3). We can ﬁnd the numbers  j,
 j,  j,  j for j = 1, 2, 3, …, k by solving the equations below using the
initial conditions  0 =  0 = 0 for j = 0 and the initial conditions for  j and
 j given in equations A2 and A3:
 j = [I – B j–1]–1A
 j = C + D j–1 j
 j = (I – B j–1)–1 [B j–1 + M]
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The solution satisﬁes the following equations:
Here a tilde on a variable denotes the value of that variable contingent on
the natural rate of interest being negative. Λij
kt+1 is the ijth element of the
matrix  kt+1. The value kt+1 depends on the number of additional periods
that the zero bound is binding (recall that here we are solving for the equi-
librium on the assumption that we know the value of the sequence
{kτ}S
τ=1). We can write the system as
We can solve this backward from the date S on which the natural rate
returns to normal with a probability of 1. We can then calculate the path
for each variable to date 0. Note that
BS–1 = DS–1 = 0.
By recursive substitution we can ﬁnd a solution of the form
where the coefﬁcients are time dependent. To ﬁnd the numbers  i,  t,
 t, and  t, consider the solution of the system in period S – 1 when BS–1
= DS–1 = 0. We have
() ˜˜, – A8 1 ZP tt t t =+   
() ˜˜
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 S–1= MS–1
 S–1 = CS–1
 S–1= VS–1.
We can ﬁnd the numbers  t,  t,  t, and  t for periods 0 to S – 2 by solv-
ing the system below (using the initial conditions shown above for S – 1):
 t = [I – Bt t+1]–1At
 t = Ct + Dt t+1 t
 t = (I – Bt t+1)–1 [Bt t+1 + Mt]
 t = Dt t+1 t + Dt t+1 + Vt.
Using the initial condition P ˜
–1 = 0, we can solve for each of the endoge-
nous variables under the contingency that the liquidity trap lasts until
period S, using equations A7 and A8. We then use the solution from equa-
tions A2 to A6 to solve for each of the variables when the natural rate
reverts back to the steady state.
Solving for {k } 
t 1
A simple way to ﬁnd the value for {kτ}S
τ=1 is to ﬁrst assume that kτ is the
same for all τ and ﬁnd the lowest kτ = k
–
so that the zero bound is never
violated. Using this initial guess for {kτ}S
τ=1, one then ﬁnds the lowest
value of kS so that the zero bound is never violated. Using this value for
kS, and k
–
for all other kτ, one then ﬁnds the lowest value of kS–1 so that the
zero bound is never violated, and so on until the lowest possible value for
k1 is found. The value thus found for the sequence {kτ}S
τ=1 can be used as a
new initial guess for {kτ}S–1
τ=1, and the procedure just described can be
repeated until the solution converges. For this paper we wrote a routine in
MATLAB that applies this method. The solution converged, and we veri-
ﬁed that the result satisﬁed all the necessary conditions.
Gauti B. Eggertsson and Michael Woodford 211
1440-03 BPEA/Eggertsson  07/17/03  08:12  Page 211Comments and 
Discussion
Benjamin M. Friedman: The pathetic ﬂoundering of the Japanese econ-
omy, with 1 percent real growth or less in seven of the last eleven years,
and falling prices in eight of the last nine, has called new attention to a
variety of economic issues that last assumed practical prominence during
and in the aftermath of the depression of the 1930s. These issues include
debt deﬂation, an insolvent banking system, bankrupt corporations, and
the potential impotence of monetary policy. The resulting discussion of
monetary policy has been particularly lively. Just as there is a difference
between a policy that is right and a policy that is wrong under any given
set of circumstances, so there is also a difference between a policy that is
merely wrong and a policy that is also wrongheaded. For years, teachers
of courses on such matters had one real-world example of wrongheaded
monetary policy to which to point, namely, the conduct of the U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve System during the depression. Now the Bank of Japan has
provided a second example for study. 
More recently, the weak performance of the American economy has
begun to raise some of the same questions about U.S. monetary policy.
With the federal funds rate now only 1 percent, the fact that nominal inter-
est rates cannot fall below zero has suddenly appeared relevant. The idea
of a “liquidity trap”—whatever that may mean—is likewise attracting
widespread interest. In the same month that this conference was held,
even the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (yes, St. Louis!) published a
short article titled “Pushing on a String”—and the point of the article was
not to dismiss the idea but to give credence to it.1
212
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was, as the name implies, a compromise. At the theoretical level, the eco-
nomics profession’s collective judgment awarded victory to the classical
school. Yes, an underemployed economy, left to its own devices, would
return to full employment. Excess supply of goods and services would
depress prices, and as long as the nominal value of outstanding money
balances remained constant—in other words, as long as the central bank
did not allow the money stock to shrink, as the Federal Reserve did in the
1930s—the consequent increase in the real value of monetary wealth
would stimulate demand and thus restore full employment. The alleged
underemployment equilibrium was not, in fact, a true equilibrium.
By contrast, at the level of empirical relevance the prize went to the
Keynesians. Yes, the Pigou effect (or, in more general terms that also
allowed for nominal government debt other than money, the real balance
effect) would eventually restore full employment. But the emphasis in
that conclusion was decidedly on the adverb. For purposes of practical
policymaking, the presumption was that this process would take far too
long for responsible authorities simply to wait it out. Hence the focus on
monetary policy that came to dominate so much of the last four decades
was relevant after all.
As James Tobin often pointed out, however, the victory claimed at the
theoretical level by the classicals was a thinner one than met the unsus-
pecting eye. On further thought, the Pigou effect was not a general propo-
sition, applicable always and everywhere. Instead, the positive effect of
falling prices on aggregate demand depended on the assumption of non-
extrapolative expectations. It was true, irrespective of expectations, that
falling prices raised the real value of a given nominal money stock. But,
as Tobin emphasized in numerous important papers, falling prices also
meant a positive return on money balances held, and the more rapidly
prices fell, the greater that return was. When prices fell, people found that
their money holdings had greater purchasing power. But, if they expected
prices to continue falling, they would also expect a further positive return
on their money balances, and therefore, under conventional assumptions
about portfolio behavior, would want to hold more of them. For the Pigou
effect to work, the increase in the supply of real money balances due to
the past fall in prices has to outweigh the increase in the demand for real
money balances due to any expected future fall in prices. Or, as Tobin put
it, inﬂationary expectations have to be nonextrapolative.
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nonextrapolative inﬂation expectations has now returned to haunt the
modern discussion of monetary policy. This was, in part, the point under-
lying Paul Krugman’s widely discussed 1998 Brookings Paper,2 which
argued that the Bank of Japan should commit itself to a target of (positive)
4 percent annual inﬂation. It has lurked not far beneath the surface of
many arguments since then about the problems of monetary policy in
Japan, or potential similar problems in the United States. It is also the
point behind this paper by Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford.
Eggertsson and Woodford’s main conclusion is that the central bank
should commit itself not to an inﬂation target but to a speciﬁc form of
price-level target. The reason, as they forthrightly acknowledge, is “to
create the right kind of expectations.” To be sure, a fully credible inﬂation
target, with a nonnegative target value, also commits monetary policy to
stop any deﬂation. But, as Eggertsson and Woodford explain, the price-
level target goes one better: it “commits the government to undo any
deﬂation by subsequent inﬂation.” Or, to use their descriptive phrase
(which I ﬁnd highly apt), the price-level target is automatically equivalent
to a “history-dependent” inﬂation target. If the economy has suffered a
deﬂation, the central bank should now aim for positive inﬂation. In a
further reﬁnement of this idea, Eggertsson and Woodford build some
additional history dependence into the price-level target itself. Not sur-
prisingly, their model simulations indicate that there is a further gain in
policy performance from doing so. (This aspect of their results is analo-
gous to A. W. Phillips’ demonstration, nearly a half century ago, that a
combination of what he called “proportional,” “integral,” and “deriva-
tive” policy components typically achieved superior stabilization results,
compared with the use of any one or even two of these components
alone.) But the central point remains: what matters in their analysis is “the
management of expectations,” speciﬁcally, expectations about inﬂation.
All this strikes me as interesting, correct, and even important. That
said, I have two substantive reservations about what the authors have
done in this paper, and ﬁve concerns about what they have not done. I will
begin with the lacunae.
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not only to undo deﬂations with subsequent inﬂations, but also to undo
inﬂations with subsequent deﬂations. Most discussion of proposals for a
price-level target for monetary policy emphasizes precisely this point.
Many historical episodes suggest that deﬂation is not a desirable outcome
for an economy arranged as ours is, and much economic analysis has
explained why. (Familiar names in this line of work include Irving Fisher,
Albert Hart, and Ben Bernanke.) Having the central bank deliberately cre-
ate a deﬂation therefore usually seems like a bad idea. Eggertsson and
Woodford’s model includes none of the mechanisms (debt defaults, for
example) that make deﬂation harmful. Hence their recommendation of a
price-level target, based on simulations of their model, is weaker than
their forceful, unqualiﬁed prose lets on.
Second, the fact that their model excludes a foreign currency asset sim-
ilarly qualiﬁes their discussion of what effects, if any, follow from mone-
tary expansion once the interest rate has hit the zero bound. The nominal
interest rate is the margin of substitution between some currency today
and the same currency in the future. In a model with only one currency
(and no equity capital), that is the only ﬁnancial margin to discuss. But
when holders of that one currency can exchange it for another, an addi-
tional margin is put in play. The fact that one margin is at a corner solu-
tion does not necessarily mean that there can be no movement at the other.
Hence the “irrelevance result” that the authors present, based on the fact
that certain variables do not enter “the complete set of restrictions . . . to
be consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium” is persuasive
about the model but not necessarily about the world. 
It usually goes without saying that analysis of this kind is contingent on
the speciﬁc model used as the engine of that analysis. But in light of the
importance of the issues being addressed here for matters of economic
policy that are currently under discussion in several countries, the point
seems to deserve particular emphasis with respect to this paper. I would
have been more comfortable if the authors had explicitly added the phrase
“in this model” to the statement of some of their key conclusions, includ-
ing especially the sentence that reads, “The above proposition [that is, the
irrelevance proposition] implies that neither the extent to which quantita-
tive easing is employed when the zero bound binds, nor the nature of the
assets that the central bank may purchase through open-market operations,
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rational expectations equilibrium.”
Third, the same point applies to the authors’ discussion of ﬁscal policy.
The authors’ model excludes any potential direct effects of ﬁscal policy
such as arise, for example, when government transfer payments are not
perfect substitutes for reduced taxes, or when private agents are liquidity
constrained and cannot borrow at the government bond rate, or when gov-
ernment spending is not a perfect substitute for private consumption.
Fourth, yet the same point also applies to debt management policy. The
authors reject the idea that some form of Operation Twist, in which either
the central bank or the ﬁscal authority buys long-term securities and sells
short-term securities, would stimulate spending. The reason is that
“changes in the composition of the securities in the hands of the public do
not change the state-contingent consumption of the representative house-
hold.” As they go on to explain, this result does not follow from assuming
that bondholders do not care about risk, or that short- and long-term secu-
rities are perfect substitutes. What matters is instead the more fundamen-
tal assumption of a representative-agent model (which requires that each
investor hold the full market portfolio of outstanding securities) together
with the further assumption that what matters to each of these representa-
tive agents is only the expected future stream of consumption. Hence the
familiar story by which changing the mix of securities outstanding affects
long- relative to short-term interest rates, which in turn matters for output
and employment because ﬁrms prefer to ﬁnance their capital spending by
issuing long-term liabilities, cannot play out in this model. 
The authors acknowledge (in their discussion, not in their model) the
possibility of such effects but dismiss them on two grounds: that in prin-
ciple they further depend on whether and how the relevant government
authorities remit any reduced debt management costs back to the public,
and that empirical evidence from the Operation Twist experiment in the
early 1960s mostly shows only minor results, if any. The theoretical claim
is certainly correct, although it further highlights the extent of the ratio-
nality ascribed to economic agents throughout the analysis: people under-
stand that when they earn less in interest on their holdings of Treasury
debt (because the Federal Reserve has bought up their higher-yielding
long-term bonds), the Federal Reserve’s earnings go back to the Treasury,
which then lowers their taxes, so that they (the investors) end up unaf-
fected. This is not the place to renew the empirical debate over the efﬁ-
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that, as is well known, our ability to judge the effectiveness of Operation
Twist is clouded by the fact that the Treasury and the Federal Reserve
were working at cross purposes, one acting to shorten the average matu-
rity of publicly held government debt and the other to lengthen it. The
other is that the tiny scale of that historical attempt at debt management is
far from what people have in mind today when they suggest that, in the
event of a potential deﬂation problem in the United States, the Federal
Reserve could affect markets by buying up long-term bonds. 
Finally, an entirely different point arises with respect to the rule that
determines the price-level target at which monetary policy aims. In the
authors’ model, the optimal path of the price level represents a trade-off
between, on the one hand, the advantages of an upward-sloping path (that
is, positive inﬂation), which reduces the likelihood that the sum of inﬂa-
tion and the natural rate of interest will be negative and therefore the zero
bound on nominal interest rates becomes binding, and, on the other, “the
distortions created by . . . inﬂation.” But what if, up to some point, the net
of those distortions due to inﬂation is a not a negative but a positive for
the economy? For example, what if George Akerlof, William Dickens,
and George Perry are right that, because of nominal wage rigidities, the
economy operates at a higher level of resource utilization, and reallocates
resources more effectively as circumstances change over time, with 2 to
3 percent inﬂation rather than zero?3 Then, on the authors’ logic, it would
be a win-win choice to aim for an upward-sloping price trajectory. Doing
so would reduce the likelihood of hitting the zero bound on nominal inter-
est rates, and it would improve the functioning of the real economy away
from that bound.
I turn in closing to two issues of a more fundamental character. First, to
return to the historical context in which I believe this paper ﬁts, the impor-
tant issue is to avoid extrapolative expectations of price declines. Put in
terms of the current debate over Japan, or perhaps even the United States,
it is important that people believe prices will rise, not fall, in the future.
But what if they do not? If the central bank simply announces a 4 percent
inﬂation target, as Krugman recommended for Japan, but monetary policy
is impotent as long as prices are falling and the natural rate of interest (to
use the term favored in this paper) is negative, why should people attach
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they don’t, then how will that announcement restore the potency of pol-
icy? It is the conundrum of Tinker Bell’s dust: If I believe in it, I can ﬂy. If
not, I can’t. And if I don’t, there’s nothing that will prove me wrong.
Most of the authors’ analysis is set in a hypothetical context in which
the central bank has already been operating according to the kind of mon-
etary policy rule that they recommend, and has done so for however long
it takes the public to understand that this is what the central bank does and
to have conﬁdence that it will keep on doing so. The point of their analy-
sis is then to show—in their model—the advantages of having in place
this form of rule rather than some other. But the whole point of the current
discussion is precisely that neither the Bank of Japan, nor the Federal
Reserve System, nor any other central bank for that matter, currently fol-
lows such a rule. (If the authors’ object were to conﬁrm the optimality of
the monetary policy rule that most of these central banks already fol-
lowed, the paper would presumably read quite differently.) Even taking at
face value the paper’s claims for the optimality of this kind of rule, the
question is how to achieve a transition from a time when the central bank
has not been following such a rule, so that there is no reason for the pub-
lic to think it is doing so, to a new regime in which the central bank is fol-
lowing this kind of rule and is fully understood to be doing so.
The authors are well aware of this issue. They discuss ways, beyond
mere announcements, for the central bank to “demonstrate resolve,” and
they appeal to what is now a fairly rich literature (but only scant experi-
ence) of giving central bankers incentives to carry out policy in particular
ways. It is no criticism to say that they have not solved this problem. But
the fact that they have not solved it does not mean that it has gone away or
that it is unimportant. 
Finally, without speciﬁcally criticizing the paper on this count, I want to
register my discomfort with the ever more explicit and exclusive focus, not
just here but in today’s monetary policy literature more generally, with
what the authors call “the management of expectations.” Over the past few
decades the literature on monetary policy has traveled a path from ignoring
expectations altogether, to taking expectations into account, to putting
expectations at the center of the analysis, and now, to making expectations
virtually the entirety of the analysis. Eggertsson and Woodford are clear: if
the central bank takes actions that do not affect expectations, those actions
simply do not matter. (Again, I would add “in their model.”) 
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follow from the proposition itself) is that the central bank need not ever
do anything. All that matters is that it affect expectations. The operating
arm of monetary policy is then not the trading desk but the press ofﬁce.
Or, to use a different metaphor, from a paper I wrote a few years ago, all
this army needs is a signal corps. On inspection, such views cannot stand
up. The situation they describe is not self-sustaining, at least not for long.
The problem to which this line of thinking nonetheless gives rise is the
increasingly exclusive focus on speciﬁcally managing expectations. The
product the ﬁrm sells may be terrible—if it’s food, it tastes awful; if it’s
wallpaper, it looks ugly; if it’s a machine, it doesn’t work; if it’s medi-
cine, it doesn’t cure anything—but the solution is to be found not in the
design laboratory but at the advertising agency. No matter what the cen-
tral bank is doing, always write the press release to say that the intended
purpose is to keep inﬂation on the straight and narrow, because that is
what the public needs to believe for the central bank to enjoy the fruits of
“credibility.” Even if inﬂation is already somewhat higher than desired,
but the central bank is cutting interest rates anyway in order to spur the
real economy out of a recession (a situation that observers of the U.S.
economy will easily recognize from the very recent past), claim nonethe-
less that the sole purpose of these actions is to preserve price stability.
Ridiculous as it sounds when put in plain language, this is precisely the
ﬂavor of some of the advice the Federal Reserve was receiving not so
long ago.
Eggertsson and Woodford do not fall into this trap. To repeat, their
analysis is all about the advantages they claim for a central bank’s actu-
ally following a particular kind of policy rule and being understood to do
so. But for many readers, I fear, their emphasis on “managing expecta-
tions” may convey the wrong message. Fortunately, the ofﬁcials actually
in charge of U.S. monetary policy have also, most of the time, been more
sensible than to fall into this trap. But the repeated and central emphasis
on the “management of expectations,” not just in this carefully crafted
paper but in so much of both the research literature and the public discus-
sion of monetary policy today as well, is worrisome nonetheless. 
Mark Gertler: The topic of this paper is important and highly relevant to
current events. As one would expect from these authors, it also contains
some interesting and innovative theoretical contributions. The paper picks
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is that a central bank may be able to lift an economy out of a liquidity trap
if it can create expectations that its policy will be expansionary in the
future. The second is that creating these expectations is a nontrivial mat-
ter. It involves making a credible commitment to stick to an inﬂationary
policy in the future, after the economy has emerged from the liquidity
trap. The paper goes beyond Krugman’s analysis, however, in several
significant ways. First, it presents a theoretical model that adds some
empirical richness. Second, it characterizes the optimal policy. Finally, it
translates that optimal policy into an operational rule that has a distinct
real-world interpretation. 
A major theme of the paper is that an economy slips into a liquidity
trap when the natural real interest rate (that is, the equilibrium interest
rate under flexible prices) becomes negative, and it emerges from the
trap when this rate becomes positive again. The authors treat the natural
real interest rate as an exogenous process, and they then study the behav-
ior of monetary policy conditional on this process. As I discuss below,
however, policymakers facing an economy on the verge of a liquidity
trap, or already enmeshed in one, may also want to consider policies that
directly influence the natural real rate. A natural candidate is a transitory
fiscal policy. In this regard, for an economy truly threatened by a liquid-
ity trap, the coordinated exercise of fiscal and monetary policy may be
desirable. This point, of course, goes back to Keynes, but it can also be
illustrated clearly within a modest variation of the authors’ contemporary
framework. 
I begin by summarizing the key aspects of the authors’ analysis and
then offer a few comments on it. I then describe how a slight extension of
the framework suggests a role for coordinated monetary and ﬁscal policy.
For countries with malfunctioning credit systems, such as Japan today,
ﬁnancial restructuring should also be factored into the policy mix. 
THE MODEL. The model is a simple general-equilibrium framework
with money and nominal rigidities in the form of staggered multiperiod
price setting. Let xt be the percentage deviation of output from its natural
(ﬂexible-price equilibrium) level; let πt be inﬂation, it the nominal rate of
interest, and rn
t the natural real rate of interest. After log-linearizing
around the deterministic steady state, it is possible to collapse the model
into the following simple system, consisting of an IS curve and a Phillips
curve, speciﬁed by 
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natural real interest rate and the current real market rate and to the
expected future output gap. The Phillips curve, in turn, relates inﬂation to
the output gap and to expected future inﬂation. The nominal interest rate it
is the instrument of monetary policy. The model thus describes the behav-
ior of xt and πt, conditional on the exogenous path of rn
t and the central
bank’s choice of it. 
The central bank would like to maintain price stability (that is, keep πt
close to zero) and stabilize the output gap (keep xt close to zero). It manip-
ulates it in order to accomplish these goals. It cannot, however, reduce it
below zero; that is, it faces the following lower-bound constraint:
As the authors’ analysis makes quite clear, the lower bound binds
when the natural real rate is negative. In this situation the economy slips
into a liquidity trap, assuming there is no expectation of excess demand in
the future. When rn
t > 0 and Etxt+1 ≤ 0, a negative real market rate is
required to keep output from slipping below the natural level, as equation
1 makes clear. Given the lower bound, however, a negative real rate can
arise only if inﬂation is expected over the next period, and that cannot
happen if the private sector does not expect excess demand to arise in the
future (that is, if Etxt+1+i ≤ 0 for all i). In this situation, accordingly, excess
supply (xt < 0) and deﬂation (πt < 0) emerge. 
As Krugman originally emphasized, even if the lower bound is bind-
ing, a central bank can still provide stimulus if it can inﬂuence beliefs
about the future course of monetary policy. The authors’ framework is
very useful for illustrating this point: here expectations of the future path
of the nominal rate affect current economic behavior. To see this directly,
iterate equations 1 and 2 forward to obtain 
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path of the real interest rate gap. In turn, these expectations affect the cur-
rent output gap. They also affect current inﬂation by affecting both the
current and the expected future path of the output gap. 
MONETARY POLICY IN THE LIQUIDITY TRAP. It follows that even if the
central bank is currently powerless to reduce the nominal rate, it can still
stimulate current economic activity by credibly committing to adopt an
expansionary policy once the economy is free of the liquidity trap. Con-
sider the following simple example. Suppose that the natural real interest
rate is expected to be negative for T periods before turning positive indef-
initely; that is, rn
t+i < 0 for i ∈ [0, T – 1], and rn
t+i > 0 for i > T. Given that the
lower bound is binding for the ﬁrst T periods, one can express the output
gap as 
Observe that the central bank can raise xt by committing to reduce it by a
sufﬁcient amount in periods t + T and after. This transmission mechanism
involves two channels. First, the expected path of it in the post-liquidity
trap period affects current spending. As equation 6 indicates, holding
expected inﬂation constant, a decline in expected future nominal rates
will directly raise xt. Second, the resulting increase in current and
expected future values of xt stimulates inﬂation, which in turn reduces real
interest rates, further stimulating current demand. Krugman has empha-
sized this latter channel. The analysis of the former, however, is new. 
Equation 6 also reveals some intuition for the authors’ proposition that
open-market purchases are ineffective when the economy is stuck in a liq-
uidity trap, unless these operations inﬂuence beliefs about the behavior of
interest rates once the economy is out of the trap. When the zero bound is
binding and ﬁscal policy is held constant, an open-market purchase affects
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1. The authors derive their irrelevance proposition for a more general case where util-
ity is nonseparable in real money balances and consumption. However, in the liquidity trap,
real money balances are beyond the satiation point and do not affect the marginal utility of
consumption. Open-market purchases, accordingly, have no effect in this more general
case, either.
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path of nominal rates in the post-liquidity trap era. This proposition is
highly relevant to the discussion of what policies to pursue in the event a
liquidity trap threatens, particularly the proposal to buy long-term bonds.
The authors’ proposition shows that such a policy will be ineffective
unless it alters beliefs about future short-term rates.2
Equation 6 also makes transparent the nature of the time-consistency
problem. To stimulate the economy, the central bank clearly would like to
create the expectation that it will pursue an expansionary policy even after
it regains its ability to manipulate short-term rates directly. This requires
committing to keep the interest rate gap, rn
t+i – (it – Et+iπt+1+i), positive for a
number of periods after T – 1. Once the economy is out of the liquidity
trap, however, the central bank will prefer to concentrate on maintaining
price and output gap stability. The best way to achieve these goals is to
adjust the nominal rate to ﬁx the interest rate gap at zero. Doing so, how-
ever, would involve reneging on the earlier pledge to keep this gap posi-
tive for a period of time. 
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN A LIQUIDITY TRAP. A signiﬁcant con-
tribution of the paper is its characterization of the optimal policy in the
liquidity trap. Here the central bank trades off the current gain from creat-
ing expectations that future policy will be expansionary against the cost of
having to stick to this expansionary policy once the economy is free of the
liquidity trap. As the authors show, when the central bank is again free to
manage nominal rates, it should do this so as to adjust demand to stabilize
the price level around the target p* t. This strategy, in turn, results in xt
responding in a “lean against the wind” fashion (when it > 0) as follows:
However, if the lower bound is binding, the central bank should set it = 0
and ratchet up the target price level for the next period, using the follow-
ing updating rule: 
() –(/ ) (* – ). 7 xp p tx t t =κ λ
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assets. In this instance the private sector will still bear the risk through ﬂuctuating taxes.
However, the authors’ irrelevance theorem (like all Miller-Modigliani theorems) is based
on the assumption of perfect capital markets. This suggests that it may be necessary to
appeal to capital market frictions to justify intervention in the long-term bond market (or to
the notion that this would send a signal about future short-term rates, in line with the
authors’ arguments).
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economy is free of the liquidity trap, the central bank creates the expecta-
tion that it will offset any deﬂationary pressure in the present with expan-
sionary policy in the future. This threat to adopt an expansionary policy,
in turn, mitigates the pain of the liquidity trap. By ratcheting the price-
level target up if the liquidity trap materializes, the central bank meets
strong deﬂationary pressure with a commitment to intensify its future
expansionary policy. The authors show, however, that a simpler policy
that keeps the path of the price-level target invariant to current conditions
closely approximates the optimal policy, under reasonable assumptions
about parameter values. 
The beneﬁt of a price-level target over an inﬂation target to ﬁght deﬂa-
tion is reasonably straightforward. It meets enhanced deﬂationary pres-
sure with an intensiﬁed commitment to pursue expansionary policy in the
future (even if the target price level is unchanged). An inﬂation target, on
the other hand, lets bygones be bygones. That is, an unusual drop in prices
today does not affect the course of policy in the future, since under inﬂa-
tion targeting a central bank is focused only on the current rate of change
in prices. Thus inﬂation targeting does not induce the same kind of stabi-
lizing adjustment of expectations about the future course of policy as does
price-level targeting. 
Of course, the authors’ result that price-level targeting is optimal
requires several qualiﬁcations. First, the simple form of the price-level tar-
geting rule is in large part a product of the purely forward-looking Phillips
curve given by equation 2. Although this form of the Phillips curve is use-
ful for gaining insight into how central banks should factor private sector
expectations into policy management, the baseline version used by the
authors does not capture the high persistence of inﬂation observed in the
actual data. However, as Jordi Galí and I have shown, a hybrid variant of
equation 2 that allows for a mix of forward- and backward-looking behav-
ior does a reasonably good job.3 Because forward-looking behavior
remains important under this speciﬁcation, the authors’ qualitative con-
clusions regarding the importance of managing future expectations will
survive. However, because inﬂation depends on lagged inﬂation as well
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3. Galí and Gertler (1999). The hybrid variation is given by πt =κ xt +γ fEtπt+1 + γbπt–1.
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get the price level and ignore past inﬂation. 
Second, the issue of time consistency remains. That is, although the
price-level target helps minimize the damage to the economy from being
in a liquidity trap, once the economy is out of the trap, the central bank
would like to abandon that target. The authors clearly recognize this issue
and propose a number of ways to properly align the central bank’s incen-
tives. Whether these strategies would work in practice, especially for an
economy like the United States, remains an open question. To date, price-
level targeting has not had much appeal. One reason may be that, as I sug-
gested earlier, price-level targeting is most appealing when price setting is
purely forward looking. The belief that at least a component of inﬂation is
backward looking naturally raises concerns about adopting a simple
price-level target.
FISCAL POLICY AND FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING. The point that the
liquidity trap is ultimately a product of having a negative natural rate of
interest, although highly transparent in the authors’ analysis, is also inher-
ent in the traditional IS/LM description of this phenomenon. Within this
traditional apparatus, a liquidity trap emerges when the IS curve intersects
the long-run aggregate supply curve at a negative interest rate. Expecta-
tions of future policy play no role in this description, however, in contrast
to the authors’ analysis. 
The traditional prescription for a liquidity trap, of course, is expansion-
ary ﬁscal policy. Fiscal stimulus shifts the IS curve outward to the point
where it intersects the long-run aggregate supply curve at a positive inter-
est rate. A suitably accommodative monetary policy, of course, should
also be part of the overall package. 
Expansionary ﬁscal policy (along with monetary accommodation) is
also a natural path to take within the authors’ framework. As in the tradi-
tional analysis, this policy, if used effectively, attacks the heart of the
problem by pushing the natural rate of interest into positive territory.
Because the authors’ framework is more highly structured than the IS/LM
model, some subtleties emerge about the nature of the desired interven-
tion that are not present in the traditional analysis. 
For example, suppose we modify the authors’ framework to allow for
government consumption as well as private consumption. Then let gt be
the logarithm of government consumption and let at be the logarithm of
technology. Then it is straightforward to show that the natural rate of
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growth rate of technology and the expected growth rate of government
expenditure: 
The equilibrium real interest rate depends positively on expected produc-
tivity growth and negatively on the expected growth rate of government
expenditure. Intuitively, the latter raises expected consumption growth
(thus pushing up the real interest rate) whereas the former reduces it. 
Suppose now that, holding ﬁscal policy constant, rn
t becomes negative
for a period of time because of a transitory period of negative productiv-
ity growth. In the absence of any policy response, the economy enters a
liquidity trap. However, by pursuing a sufﬁciently aggressive transitory
increase in government expenditure, the ﬁscal authority can push the nat-
ural rate into the positive region, thus avoiding the trap. An important dif-
ference from the traditional analysis is that the government commits to
making the expansion transitory: if the private sector perceives the expan-
sion as permanent, it will not affect the natural rate.4
I am not suggesting ﬁscal policy as a substitute for the authors’ mone-
tary prescription but rather as a complementary policy initiative. One
virtue of this approach is that it involves offering direct stimulus to the
economy as opposed to resting one’s hopes entirely on private sector
expectations of future (monetary) stimulus. Of course, before any ﬁrm
conclusions may be drawn, a formal analysis of ﬁscal policy along the
lines of the authors’ analysis of monetary policy would be desirable.
Along these lines, modifying the authors’ framework to allow for ﬁscal
tools would seem to provide a good starting point. 
Finally, it is important to recognize that malperformance of credit mar-
kets is a key feature of economies truly enmeshed in a liquidity trap, such
as the U.S. economy during the Great Depression and the Japanese econ-
omy today. At a conceptual level, credit market frictions raise the likeli-
hood that the zero bound will bind. They do so by reducing the real market
interest rate required to produce zero excess demand (that is, xt = 0). To see
this, consider the following very stylized example. Suppose that χt is the
premium for external ﬁnance that borrowers must pay, owing to the pres-
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natural rate of interest, although transitory movements will have a larger effect.
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tors as borrowers’ collateral and the overall conditions of financial insti-
tutions. In this environment the opportunity cost of investing is given by
χt + it – Etπt+1, implying that the interest rate gap is now given by rn
t – [χt
+ it – Etπt+1], where rn
t now has the interpretation of being the natural real
rate in the absence of credit market frictions. In this instance the zero
bound will bind if rn
t – χt < 0.
Since χt > 0, ﬁnancial market frictions raise the likelihood that the
economy will slip into a liquidity trap. Intuitively, the rise in the cost of
credit owing to these frictions requires lower risk-free market rates than
otherwise to keep overall borrowing costs from stiﬂing demand and edg-
ing the economy into a deﬂation. To the extent ﬁnancial reforms and
ﬁnancial market restructuring reduce χt, they help ease the economy out
of the liquidity trap. As with ﬁscal policy, credit market improvements
potentially provide direct stimulus for an economy in the midst of a liq-
uidity trap.
General discussion: James Duesenberry was skeptical of the authors’
assumption that expectations and credibility are the crucial elements in
policymaking. He noted that policy credibility depends on economic
agents believing that policy is effective—that when the Federal Reserve
says it is going to do something to stimulate the economy, it can actually
make it happen. He observed that even the Federal Reserve’s ability to
control the term structure of interest rates was uncertain. Certainly, expec-
tations about future federal funds rates are an important determinant of
the term structure, but other expectations, for example about the level of
capital utilization or the demand for housing, also play an important role,
and these are not exclusively influenced by monetary policy. Even more
problematic is whether the Federal Reserve has the ability (except when
in a liquidity trap) to steer the economy exactly where the Federal
Reserve wants it to go. Many believe that the efforts of monetary policy
are sometimes like “pushing on a string,” and even monetary economists
are uncertain about its effectiveness. Moreover, monetary policy is sup-
posed to work though a variety of channels, affecting investment through
changes in the cost of capital, consumption through wealth effects in the
stock market, and the balance of payments through changes in the
exchange rate, and other examples could be cited. Duesenberry noted
that a recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York arrived at a
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authors were themselves pessimistic about the precision of monetary
policy interventions. 
Christopher Sims thought it unfortunate that the paper followed a
recent practice in the literature of making very strong and artiﬁcial
assumptions about ﬁscal policy. In the authors’ model, the ﬁscal authority
pegs the real value of total government liabilities without regard to the
proportions of high-powered money and interest-bearing debt. Sims gave
two reasons for ﬁnding this objectionable. First, this policy is not optimal
in a simple Lucas-Stokey or Barro model. In both models real debt should
respond endogenously to shocks. Second, the policy implies that a ﬁscal
authority, confronted with a large amount of liabilities in the form of
high-powered money, would feel just as committed to raise taxes to retire
that money stock as it would to raise taxes to reduce the same amount of
interest-bearing debt. This is implausible: the division of liabilities
between interest-bearing debt and money should affect the amount of
pressure—or lack of pressure—on the legislature to raise taxes.
William Brainard likewise emphasized the composition of government
debt. In the authors’ model, short-term interest rates link consumption
across successive periods, and therefore current and expected short-term
rates are what matter. To achieve a desired effect on the economy, it then
sufﬁces for the monetary authority to announce the rule it will follow in
setting future short-term rates. The long-term bond rate reﬂects this rule
but plays no separate role in affecting private actions. In reality, however,
announcing a rule for future short-term rates may be quite different from
intervening today in order to inﬂuence the long-term rate. Investments in
capital equipment are irreversible in the short run; as a result, the risk of
borrowing long term for such investments is different from undertaking a
sequence of short-term borrowings. Setting today’s long-term rate elimi-
nates all manner of uncertainties, including uncertainty about the mone-
tary authority’s credibility. 
Christopher Sims agreed with Benjamin Friedman that a price-level
target is undesirable in times of high inﬂation if disinﬂation has real costs.
In a rational expectations model, the commitment to a price-level target,
and hence to deﬂation following an inﬂation, makes inﬂation less likely,
but it might be quite difﬁcult to make this costly commitment credible.
Sims suggested that an asymmetric commitment might be more appropri-
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rates of deﬂation experienced were very low. As a consequence, the
amount of inﬂation tomorrow to which one would have to commit today
in order to reach the price-level target is not high. On the other hand, we
have seen episodes of very rapid and large inﬂation, and Sims thought it
would not be possible to credibly commit to returning prices to their ini-
tial level after such an episode.
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